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The objective of this thesis is to suggest a daily
routine debriefing process for the maintenance sections of
the Israeli Air Force fighter squadrons. It is argued that
the debriefing process may serve as vehicle for higher level
of personal and organizational effectiveness.
Ongoing debriefing process in one squadron, has been
assessed, opinion data have been collected, and relevant
literature has been reviewed. The questions addressed in
this study, are: (1) what is the role of debriefing process
in the maintenance sections: (2) what is the debriefing
structure, forums, frequency, and discussion subjects; (3)
what are the attitudes of targeted sectors toward the
suggested procedure, and (4) what are the organizational
changes and concerns to be considered when implementing this
change.
Results have indicated strong positive attitudes, cost-
beneficial appearance, and practicality of the proposed
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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this thesis is to assess the suitabili-
ty of the debriefing process for the maintenance sections of
the fighter sguadrons in the Israeli Air Force (IAF) . Such
debriefing processes have not yet been adopted. It is felt
that a debriefing process would improve work performance,
organizational climate, communication, and the like. This
study will, hopefully, confirm or deny those feelings.
A. WHAT A DEBRIEFING PROCESS IS
Debriefing is a process of reviewing or assessing
event (s), and/or performance by its/their participant (s)
.
In the context of this thesis, the debriefing process refers
to a scheduled meeting of workers (enlisted/officers) , where
they discuss their performance, their problems associated
with the mission and/or performance, and try to draw
conclusions for future improvement. The debriefing process
could appear in many different forms and situations. The
principle which underlies debriefing, is to review and
summarize past performance and draw conclusions for future
use.
B. THE PROBLEM AND THE THRUST
The writer's experience has shown that aircrews' atti-
tudes, approaches, and culture are much different than other
populations within the same organization. In most cases,
although in the same squadron, aircrews speak a "different
language" than maintenance crews, they also behave differ-
ently, view and react to events differently, and "do
business" differently. This phenomenon could be attributed
to some causes such as different human potential, different
education prior to joining the military, different social
segment or different education and experience throughout the
military. The difference in education during the military
period seems to be the most accessible and practical item
for study and therefore could be studied if isolated. The
learning process in the aircrews population appears to be
much more efficient and rapid. One could attribute many of
the above differences to the different education or, more
specifically, to the debriefing process.
Aircrews learn in the beginning of their training to
critically and honestly assess their own performance, openly
share their ideas and feelings about the mission, give and
receive feedback, and emphasize the "lessons learned,"
rather than focusing or appraising the personal performance.
The IAF found the aircrews "Debriefing Institution" as an
extremely useful vehicle for mutual learning and self-
development, and have exploited these sessions for other
communication needs as well. This process continues along
their flying career on a daily basis, and presumably
significantly influences and shapes the IAF culture.
The maintenance sections, on the other hand, do not have
such a debriefing process. People from these two popula-
tions often meet for a common debriefing in the headquar-
ters, for instance, and then the cultural difference as well
as a difference in mentality immediately emerge. The
existence of this difference is broadly accepted throughout
the IAF, although the cause and effect relations may be
differently interpreted.
The "way of doing business" on the aircrews part,
appears to be better than on the maintenance crews part in
many respects. This is the writer's thesis, that those
benefits can and should be gained by the maintenance crews
as well.
C. THE STUDY OBJECTIVES, QUESTIONS, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS
The objectives of this study are to suggest a debriefing
process for the maintenance sections of the IAF fighter
squadrons, and to identify and discuss some of the problems
associated with the implementation phase of such a debrief-
ing. The scope, however, is limited to the IAF fighter
squadrons, although the principles could be applied to other
IAF units as well.
A debriefing process presumably contains many psycholog-
ical, physiological, and social aspects of human behavior.
Comprehensive theoretical analysis may include broad areas
such as psychology, sociology, organizational behavior and
management, which are beyond the scope of this work. This
study, however, is concentrated upon the practical aspects
of the issue, although some theoretical aspects have been
reviewed, and pieces of theory have been utilized to
reinforce, support, or explain, when it seemed appropriate.
Two theoretical aspects have been reviewed: (1) performance
feedback; and (2) the management of change. Those are by no
means the only pertinent ones, or necessarily the most
important ones.
The questions addressed in this study are: (1) what is
the role of the debriefing process in the maintenance
sections; (2) what are the debriefing structure, forums,
frequency, and discussion subjects; (3) what are the atti-
tudes of targeted sectors toward the suggested procedure;
and (4) what are the organizational changes and concerns to
be considered when implementing this change?
Limitations imposed upon the study were the physical
distance of the targeted "field," and the lack of scientific
experimental design. There is only one squadron which has
implemented such a debriefing process. This ongoing process
had not been originally designed as an experiment, and thus
has lacked the advantages of a controlled experiment. How-
ever, opinion data have been gathered from that squadron,
which have been utilized for some analyses.




(1) Debriefing—A scheduled meeting where participants
review, summarize, share ideas, and draw conclusions
out of a certain activity or performance. A
debriefing session typically follows every exercise,
special event or extraordinary occurrence.
2 Abbreviations
(1) Israeli Air Force (IAF)
;
(2) Commanding Officer (CO)






(6) Line Chief (LC)
;
(7) Department Chief (DC)
.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
In the following chapters the organizational background
is provided, feedback literature is reviewed, the
methodology of research is discussed, analysis of data is
presented, implementation problems of the particular
debriefing session are discussed in conjunction with the
literature and, finally, conclusions are drawn and recommen-
dations are suggested.
The background in Chapter II will provide the reader
with a general idea of the relevant part of the organiza-
tional structure and culture. In the literature review,
Chapter III, feedback characteristics are noted. In Chapter
IV a review of literature about change processes is
presented and is inserted next to the discussion regarding
the implementation phase. An overview of the methods used
and limitations imposed on the study are presented in the
methodology, Chapter IV. In Chapter V, the reader is
provided with the questions and the analysis of the data.
This chapter offers the researcher's interpretation of that
data. In Chapter VI, the implementation phase, the relevant
literature is reviewed. This chapter discusses the antici-
pated problems and points out how and where some theoretical
models may be used to ensure successful implementation. The
last chapter, Chapter VII, contains the conclusions drawn
from the study and suggests recommendations for practical
use.
II. BACKGROUND
A. STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY
A typical Israeli fighter squadron is composed of two
sections, namely, the Aircrew Section and the Maintenance
Section. At the head of these two sections are placed two
A/F majors, each of whom is a professional in his area. He
reports directly to the squadron commander (CO) . The
commander of the Aircrews Section serves also as the
squadron vice commander, but his major concern is aimed at
the Aircrews Section. His other job as a vice squadron
commander consists more of being an available replacement
whenever needed. Special missions are sometimes delegated
to him. The Maintenance Section Commander (MSC) is a
ground-crew officer, and is the senior maintenance
professional in the squadron.
The maintenance section is composed of lines and depart-
ments. The area where the aircraft (AC) are parked is
called a "Line." In each squadron there are a number of
lines which are physically distant from each other and from
the squadron headquarters (HQ) . The departments are
typically located in close proximity to the squadron head-
quarters. The departments are divided by professional skill
types.
The head of each line/department is a petty officer,
typically E-7/E-8. A permanent maintenance crew is assigned
to each line and department. The crews on the line,
composed of the various professional skills, perform routine
service, prepare AC's for flights and solve minor mainte-
nance problems. The responsibilities of the department
crews, on the other hand, are to perform major maintenance
actions which can not be handled on the line, to perform
more complicated maintenance procedures, and to provide
spare parts and training as needed. Typically, the less
experienced and more junior enlisted are assigned to the
lines, while the more senior technicians are usually
assigned to the departments.
Working shifts do not exist. Most of the work force
remains at work until the job is completed. The work day
length depends almost solely on the type and number of mal-
functions which have occurred during that particular day. A
typical work day length is about 12-14 hours for the
juniors. The seniors (who are on voluntary career service
as opposed to the juniors who are obligated to regular
service) have a much shorter work day of about eight hours.
Some of the seniors are required to stay after the normal




The Maintenance ground crews have received their basic
maintenance training in the Air Force Technical School, and
more advanced training in the additional courses within and
outside their squadrons. However, the most significant part
of the training, and all of the daily practical skills, have
been acquired on the job. Most of the work force,
especially on the lines, are junior enlisted who have not
finished their training process. The culture, or the "way
of doing things here," has a significant influence upon the
junior enlisted. The on-the-job training is a crucial part
of the overall training in the first years of service. Much
effort is devoted for training and enhancement of the work
force, along with fulfillment of the other requirements.
Maintaining a high level of performance is a prerequisite
for tasks such as AC maintenance. Errors or substandard
work may lead to safety hazards or even fatalities. A great
deal of emphasis, therefore, is placed upon the quality of
work.
The nature of the human relationships within the mainte-
nance section heavily depends upon the leadership style and
the MSC's abilities. The CO's leadership style has also a
significant influence on the atmosphere, motivation, and
performance of the maintenance section personnel. One of
the most popular attitudes of commanders in the IAF is to
create and maintain open channels of communication
horizontally and vertically. The actual degree of openness,
however, varies from squadron to squadron and depends
heavily upon the command's management style, priorities, and
preferences. Communication difficulties resulting from
technical or personal barriers still exist.
C. THE DEBRIEFING PROCESS BACKGROUND
As mentioned earlier, the debriefing process is a
routine procedure of the aircrew sections. It does not take
place in the maintenance sections. However, one squadron
has applied a debriefing process to its maintenance section
and this squadron has 18 months of an ongoing debriefing
process. This will be evaluated later. The following is
the "history" of that debriefing.
The CO of that squadron at the time who initiated that
process was concerned with what he felt were unacceptable
attitudes of maintenance officers or ex-maintenance officers
toward debriefing of exercises and/or other performance. He
noticed the different in approach between aircrews and
maintenance crews. After discussing his concerns with the
Air Force Chief of Maintenance, he decided to initiate an
educational program from the bottom up, starting in his own
squadron. The more he thought about the idea, the more he
became convinced about its advantages and his ability to
carry it out. He forwarded his ideas to peers and
subordinates, and did not find any major conceptual
arguments against it. However, doubts have been raised
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about the practicality of applying such time-consuming
processes to the maintenance section which was already
overloaded with the normal work. One of the sound arguments
against the idea was the "cost/benefit" argument, which
consists of the big "price" (time) that had to be paid for
what looked like intangible benefits which might be
considered nebulous, and without payoff. In spite of these
arguments, trusting in his belief and vision, he decided to
implement the debriefing in his squadron. After convincing
his MCS , he conducted meetings with the key people in the
squadron to convince them and ensure their support and
commitment. After ensuring a critical mass of key persons
who had supported the idea, he explained it to the entire
squadron and announced it to be their main goal for the
coming training term. To promote a good starting point of
openness and a more honest atmosphere, he announced in
public that he would not penalize in any manner, any
maintenance crew member who had made an error at work, and
who now shared his "lesson learned" with others during the
debriefing session.
The debriefing process consisted of two stages: (1)
debriefing of the lines/departments; and (2) debriefing of
Line-Chiefs (LC) /Department-Chiefs (DC). The first one
included all the crewmen in the respective line/department,
headed by the LC or DC, respectively. The timing of the
debriefing has varied but in most cases it has been
11
performed in the afternoon after all scheduled flights have
finished. The second debriefing included the entire LC/DC
and the maintenance officers, and was headed by the MSC.
That second debriefing closely followed the first one, with
the intention to summarize the debriefings of the lines/
departments, as well as creating an opportunity to discuss
other problems or issues on a broader level.
Sguadron commanders in that squadron have changed since
the debriefing process began, but the procedure has remained
pretty much the same.
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III. PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK—LITERATURE REVIEW
Performance feedback has been included in the literature
and practiced in the field for a long time in an attempt to
understand and use it to enhance productivity. Studies of
different feedback dimensions have been made and several
authors have suggested a conceptual framework to make them
more understandable. It seems that no one conceptual frame-
work is broadly accepted among the researchers and there is
no agreement whether performance feedback should be viewed
as a whole or partitioned to its characteristics. Most
researchers, however, agree that any characteristics which
could be defined are at least not mutually exclusive. In
this review, six characteristics of feedback offered by
Fairbank and Prue (1982) will be utilized as a basis for the
discussion.
Several definitions of feedback are suggested in the
literature. Duncan and Bruwelheide (1986) have grouped them
into "Formal" and "Operational" definitions. Brethower
(1972) defines feedback as "Information about past perform-
ance which is used to guide future performance." Murrell
(1975) defines feedback as "Information return related to an
output." Different definitions sometimes represent the
difference in approaches, categorization or emphasis.
Illgen, Fisher and Taylor (1979) have recognized feedback
13
"as essential for learning and for motivation on
performance-oriented organizations." They conceived of
feedback as "a special case of the general communications
process in which some sender conveys a message to a recipi-
ent." Another researcher, Annett (19 69), viewed feedback as
motivation, typically, in the context of goal setting.
Vroom (1964), in his expectancy theory, concluded that
feedback operates by means of three processes: (1) feedback
as a relationship between performance and consequences; (2)
feedback that serves as a learning or informational
function, (3) feedback that serves as a motivational
function. "According to Vroom 's (1964) theory, feedback is
an incentive, or a promise, of a reward based on correct or
appropriate performance." (Duncan and Bruwelheide, 1986)
"Information about the performance of individuals and
groups has long been seen as a potentially powerful tool to
enhance organizational effectiveness." (Nadler, 1979) That
conclusion has been supported by large databases (Prue,
Frederiksen, and Bacon, 1978; Ford, 1980). Understanding of
the dimensions of feedback and its interrelationship with
other interventions is the focus of some current research.
A. FEEDBACK CHARACTERISTICS
As mentioned, six characteristics of feedback were
identified. These are: (1) feedback source; (2) feedback
privacy; (3) feedback participants; (4) feedback content;
14
(5) feedback mechanism; and (6) temporal characteristics of
feedback.
1. Feedback Sources
"Feedback source referred to the individual or
device that presented the information to the performer."
(Balcazar, Hopkins, and Suarez, 1986) They defined 11 feed-
back sources:






(7) Customers, and various combinations of sources;
(8) Supervisor's and self-generated feedback;
(9) Mechanical and supervisor's feedback;
(10) Researcher and supervisor's feedback; and
(11) Supervisors and co-workers' feedback.
Greller and Herold (1975) postulated five feedback sources,
namely, formal organization, immediate supervisor, co-
workers, the task, and self. They found that the informa-
tiveness of these sources increased as they moved from
psychologically distant (i.e., to the formal organization)
to psychologically closer (i.e., to one's own feelings and
ideas) sources. Herold and Parsons (1985) reinforced these
15
findings as well as Hansen and Muchinsky's (1978) findings
concerning the ordering of feedback.
In reviewing the empirical literature of the last
ten years, Balcazar, et al., (1986) concluded that "feedback
delivered by supervisors or managers has been more frequent-
ly associated with consistent effects" (as opposed to the
other sources in which they could not find any evidence of
consistent effects throughout their review) . Herold and
Liden (1987) concluded from their field research that
individuals viewed feedback from least positively to most
positively in the following order: feedback from formal
organization, feedback from co-workers, feedback from
supervisors, tasks, and finally, the individual's own
feelings and ideas.
Illgen et al., (1979) suggested that the credibility
and power of the source are important dimensions. Other
researchers found that workers valued feedback from sources
that were closer to the performance of the task (Tuckman and
Oliver, 1968; Greller et al., 1980; Greller & Herold, 1975).
2 . Feedback Privacy
Feedback privacy referred to the intended audience
of the feedback, or whether the feedback is distributed
publicly, privately or any combination of both. Balcazar et
al., (1986) defined these three types: (1) publicly posted
feedback; (2) private feedback; and (3) a combination of
these. Prue and Fairbank (1981) agree to that division, and
16
stress that the degree of the combination varies on a
continuum. They analyze, for the sake of simplicity, only
the two extremes of that continuum. Welsch et al., (173),
Greene et al
. , (1975), Quillitch (1975), Quillitch (1978)
have suggested that public feedback may have greater effect
than private feedback. Prue and Fairbank (1981) , on the
other hand, stressed that "the degree to which performance
information is made public or private within an organization
should be determined by a variety of factors." They suggest
that private feedback is best used when:
(a) baseline performance is low and publicly displayed
feedback might be too aversive; (b) supervisors are inter-
personally skilled to deliver feedback on a one-to-one
basis; (c) resources exist for the expenses incurred in
delivering individual feedback; (d) workers are in close
proximity to their supervisors; and (e) an individual
performance is being compared with baseline performance or
a designated standard.
In addressing the practical aspect of feedback delivery,
they emphasize that public feedback is relatively less
demanding, more convenient, less time consuming, and thus,
cheaper. However, they refer to certain types of public
feedback, such as a bulletin, graphs, summaries, etc. Their
conclusion may not be applicable to feedback processes such
as group discussion, debriefing and so forth.
Balcazar et al., (1986) found in their empirical
research review that no significantly different effects
exist between the above feedback types.
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3 . Feedback Participants
Feedback participants are the people whose perform-
ance was described by the feedback. Performance could be
attributed to an individual, a group, or any combination of
these. Balcazar et al., (1986) simply defined these three:
(1) individual (s) ; (b) group(s); (c) individual (s) and
group (s) combined. Nadler (1979) has agreed upon the indi-
vidual and group dimensions but has defined a third type of
individual in group setting. According to Nadler' s analy-
sis, feedback concerning group performance will affect the
individual differently than if it is seen as simply an
individual performance. He has attributed that difference
to the difficulty of the individual to separate his/her own
performance from the group performance, the limitation to
act on the information by the inherent nature of the group,
and the limited influence an individual may have on the
total group performance given the structure of the group's
task (Steiner, 1972). Nadler (1979) has described a group
performance model for better understanding of why and how
feedback should affect the performance of task performing
group.
Emmert (1978) reported an increased productivity in
a manufacturing facility due to group feedback. An addi-
tional increase in productivity had been achieved when
individual feedback was provided to the workers. Shook et
al., (1978) also found that individual feedback is more
18
effective than group feedback. Newby and Robinson (1983)
reported that individual feedback alone and individual
feedback with reinforcement increased efficiency, whereas
group feedback did not. On the other hand, Welsch et al.,
(197 3) were in favor of group feedback.
4 . Feedback Content
Feedback content refers to the type of information
provided to recipients. Balcazar et al., (1986) identified
eight kinds of content: (a) comparison of an individual's
performance with his/her previous performance; (b) compari-
son of a group's performance with its previous performance;
(c) comparison of an individual's performance with a
standard of individual performance; (d) comparison of a
group's performance with a standard of group performance;
(e) comparison of individual performance with group perform-
ance; (f) comparison of individual performance with group
performance and with a standard of group performance; (g)
comparison of individual performance with a standard of
group performance; and (h) comparison of group performance
with a standard of individual performance.
Prue at al., (1981) stressed the need to address
some considerations when selecting feedback content. Among
their suggested considerations are the types of information
available within the organization, whether or not
comparisons can be technically drawn between employees, and
19
the number of employees whose performance is below, above,
or at standard.
Hamner and Hamner (1976) , McCall (1975) , have
suggested that effective feedback should be clear and under-
standable, specific to the targeted behavior, and have
emphasized the performance of the recipient. Nadler et al.,
(197 6) suggested that feedback should only convey informa-
tion that is useful for improving or maintaining desired
performance. Balcazar et al., (1986) have stated that
"feedback should be an accurate reflection of the work
done," and that "feedback should be quantitative." Annet
(1969) , Bilodeau (1966) , and Bourne (1966) have suggested
that recipients must be able to convert or transform the
feedback message to units that are meaningful to them.
Another topic that is addressed in many studies is
the sign of the feedback, and its influence on supervisors
and subordinates. Tesser and Rosen (1975) found a large
amount of empirical evidence that, in general, people are
reluctant to communicate negative information to another
person when the information directly concerns that person.
The promptness and frequency of feedback also is found to be
correlated to its sign. Illgen et al., (1984) have
concluded that although supervisors are one of the most
valuable sources of feedback, supervisors tend to be very
poor sources. This may be due to several factors, such as
distortion of negative feedback, and the reluctant to give
20
negative feedback. Illgen et al., (1981) also concluded
that "supervisors distort negative feedback when it must be
given personally," and they tend to give less appropriate
feedback when they attribute performance to ability rather
than effort. Duncan (1986) suggested that when positive
information is compared to negative information, the feed-
back has been equivocal and in general have shown that
positive and negative information are not necessarily polar
extremes.
5 . Feedback Mechanism
Feedback mechanism refers to the means used to
communicate the feedback information to the recipients.
Prue and Fairbank (1981) have described four basic feedback
mechanisms, namely, verbal, written, mechanical, and self-
recorded. Balcazar et al., (1986) have added graphs which
display individual/group performance, and several combina-
tions of the above, while ignoring the self-recorded
feedback.
Verbal feedback, according to Prue and Fairbank
(1981) , is perceived to be the easiest to submit, but some
limitations should be taken into account, such as the inter-
personal relationship between the supervisor and the
subordinate, the supervisor's interpersonal skills, and
physical distance which may technically prohibit face-to-
face meeting, etc. This type of feedback is the most common
use.
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Written feedback refers to a variety of forms
including: written personal communications (Weitz et al.,
1954); memos (Kreitner et al., 1977); newsletters (Patterson
et al., 1972); and public posting of information (Quillitch,
1974) . Performance appraisal is also a sort of written
feedback, and is typically kept in files for future compari-
sons or use. Prue and Fairbank (1981) have emphasized the
aversiveness as a disadvantage of the most common method of
written feedback, the public posted feedback. However, they
noted other advantages of written feedback including: it
serves as a concrete, long term assessment of performance;
it can be easily monitored by the manager; and it serves as
a complete history of employees which may be used for other
purposes, e.g., training.
Mechanical feedback is the feedback provided by
mechanical devices such as videotape or other electromechan-
ical records of any performance measures. Examples of these
have been discussed by Bricker et al., (1972), Walter
(1975), and Parsons (1974). Prue et al., (1981) have
pointed out that although this feedback type has been found
to be efficient in the short run, not enough research has
been done to assess the long run influence. They have
suggested that further exploring of the long run influence
is needed because these devices are relatively cheap,
provide continuous and prompt feedback, and thus may have a
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promising future. They have also suggested assessing the
combination of mechanical devices in relation to verbal
feedback. This issue has been addressed by Ford (1984), who
analyzed the effects of three feedback procedures on the
teaching skills of paraprofessionals in a mental retardation
facility. He compared supervisor feedback, videotape
feedback, and a combination of both. He found that the
combination yielded the greatest and most rapid improvement
in work performance, whereas supervisor feedback and
videotape alone, yielded improvement but not as much.
None of the above researchers have noted the objec-
tivity of such devices. The elimination of human biases or
perceived biases by recipients of the feedback would be a
great advantage of such devices in addition to their
accuracy, promptness, and price.
Self-recorded feedback refers to the mechanism of
delivering performance data by having the employees generate
their own feedback by self-recorded performance (Komaki et
al., 1980). Although self-recording mechanisms have not
been widely applied and researched, some studies reported
usage of such technigues (Komaki et al., 1980; Lamal and
Benfield, 1978; Prue et al., 1980). Those studies demon-
strated the utility of self-monitoring mechanisms in organi-
zational interventions.
Greller (1980) reported that employees favored
feedback systems upon which they had control, more than
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externally administered systems. Prue and Fairbank (1981)
noted that self-monitoring systems could be useful when
there are no physical products to count or measure,
employees are not closely supervised, or when work process
variables such as effective use of time, play an important
role in the overall productivity.
6 . Temporal Characteristics of Feedback
Temporal characteristics of feedback refer to the
question of when and how often feedback should be provided,
including the total duration of the feedback interaction,
the time delay between performance and the feedback on that
performance (Prue and Fairbank, 1981) , and the frequency of
feedback.
Prue and Fairbank (1981) stated that the duration of
the feedback session is a function of the content and the
mechanism employed to deliver the information, and thus
plays an interdependent role with other feedback factors.
They have stressed that the duration is not a significant
factor by itself.
Numerous researchers have studied the influence of
delayed feedback on the performance. Prue and Fairbank
(1981) concluded that no significant difference between
prompt and delayed feedback has been found in field studies,
and the feedback has yielded positive results no matter how
big was the time lag. Krumhus and Malott (1980) have also
concluded that immediate feedback was no more effective than
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delayed feedback. However, Mager and Pipe (1970)
,
Pennypacker (1975) , Hall (1975) , Fuqua (1976) concluded that
feedback should be immediate.
Illgen et al., (1979), Cook (1968) found a positive
relationship between frequency of feedback and performance.
Balcazar et al., (1986) reported that daily and weekly
feedback are much more consistently effective than monthly
feedback. Therefore, they concluded, feedback should be
provided at least weekly.
The feedback classification that guided the above
review is structural in nature. Many studies have parti-
tioned the feedback by its components in order to study its
various dimensions and to understand the impact of each on
the worker. Real life situations, however, are much more
complex and have less control over other variables. Under-
standing of the cause-consequence relationship in many cases
is not totally clear. One could also point out the lack of
agreement among researchers as a sufficient indication of
the ambiguity of this subject. Balcazar et al., (1986), who
tried to draw some conclusions from the empirical research
of the last ten years, also faced many inconsistent results,
in addition to the more consistent ones. Larson et al.,
(1985) tried to assess the timeliness, specificity, frequen-
cy and sensitivity of the manager's positive and negative
performance feedback. They found that those variables
covaried very strongly. They concluded that it may be more
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appropriate to focus on the overall quality of the managers'
feedback than to treat each dimension separately. Duncan
and Bruwelheide (1986) have also suggested that we focus
future research on functional rather than structural
grounds.
B . SUMMARY
Some characteristics of feedback have been defined and
reviewed. The literature has not suggested clear-cut
conclusions about the separate feedback characteristics.
One of the reasons might be that these characteristics are
not mutually exclusive. Studying the feedback as a pure
phenomenon is impossible in many cases because feedback
serves other functions such as reinforcement, stimulus
control, etc. In many organizational settings, goals and
feedback are set together, so an attempt to distinguish
between effects is useless. Some studies have suggested
focusing on the functional rather than on the structural
aspects of the feedback.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. METHODOLOGY
The debriefing process which has already been
implemented in one maintenance section was a natural target
for the current study. However, this debriefing process had
not been designed as a scientific experiment. It had been
designed and performed according the sguadron commander's
belief and vision at that time. Thus, some difficulties for
scientific research have emerged. A scientific experiment
reguires experimental variables, or experimental group, and
control group. There is also a need for reliable measures
to assess the influence of the "treatment" (the debriefing
process) on the experimental group and compare it to the
control group. Another possible research design could have
been the time-series approach which reguires observations of
the experimental group before and after the treatment.
Neither of the above could have been completely attained in
this case. To accomplish the experimental design, a good
objective measure of consequences should have been designed
or existent. Such good objective measures in the ongoing
setting could not be identified although an attempt to find
them had been made. However, control groups were available,
namely, two other squadrons. Both have possessed the same
AC type and have been similar in size and missions. One of
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those squadrons is located in the same base and the other is
located in a different base. The experimental squadron,
namely, the squadron where the debriefing process has been
implemented, is titled in this study as squadron number one
(#1). The sister squadron within the same base is titled
squadron number two (#2) , and the third squadron, which is
in the different base, is titled squadron number three (#3)
.
The ongoing debriefing being studied, as mentioned, has
been in process about 18 months. In that respect the
research is an ex-post facto design. However, the research
is not aimed at the scientific determination of the cause-
effect relationships but at the contribution of the debrief-
ing to some hypothesized areas, its characteristics, and its
implementation problems as defined by the research
questions.
In these circumstances, and after considering the
available research methods, the conclusion was to rely upon
opinion data as the main source of the information which was
needed for the assessment, namely, the survey method. The
control groups could not serve to compare consequences
because these could not have been objectively measured, as
mentioned, but rather have served to compare opinions and
attitudes in several issues hypothesized to be different.
In that respect, the research has attributes of a field
study.
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To collect meaningful opinion data, four questionnaires
were designed: (1) a questionnaire for line/departments
enlisted personnel in the three squadrons (for opinions 1
comparison purposes) regarding general attitudes about the
hypothesized issues; (2) a questionnaire for squadron #1
regarding the actual debriefing process; (3) a questionnaire
for LC/DC's and officers in squadron #1 regarding their
debriefing with the MSC; and (4) a questionnaire for the COs
and MSCs of the three squadrons to assess their general
approaches toward the idea of a maintenance section's
debriefing. The opinion survey could not have been
performed but through the mail because of the physical
distance. On the other hand, due to the nature of the
surveyed units, the percentage of answered questionnaires
was relatively high.
The debriefing implementation recommendations have been
based on the subjective experience of the writer, and have
been partially supported by several pieces of existent
theories in the field of change.
Overall, to answer the research questions, the use of
the following methods have been made: field study, survey
research, and theoretical study.
B. QUESTIONNAIRES
As mentioned, four questionnaires have been assembled.
The questionnaires were written originally in Hebrew and a
translation into English is presented in the analysis
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chapter and the Appendix. The questions were composed by
the writer who is familiar with the environment and culture
of a squadron, and had made an effort to use the "mainte-
nance section language." Some of the questions have been
worded pretty closely to each other for reinforcement and
reliability purposes. These questions were mixed up to
avoid an observable pattern by the personnel who were to
fill out the questionnaire. The original questionnaires
were reviewed, prior to submission, by the questionnaire's
specialist of the main IAF Sociology Office.
The questionnaires for line/department enlisted
personnel in all three squadrons, for LC/DC's in squadron
#1, and for enlisted personnel in squadron #1, were designed
to test the following hypotheses:
(1) The debriefing is a vehicle for transfer of informa-
tion from top-down and bottom-up within the
maintenance section;
(2) The debriefing is a tool for mutual learning and
professional enhancement;
(3) The debriefing is a vehicle for enhancement of
environment and relationships between individuals in
the lines/departments;
(4) The debriefing is a vehicle for enhancement of open-
ness and freedom in expressing concerns;
(5) The debriefing is an educational tool for honesty,
and admission of maintenance errors;
(6) The debriefing is a tool for performance feedback;
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(7) Participants appreciate the debriefing process in
general .
^
Additional issues which were addressed in squadron #l's
questionnaires are several procedural aspects of the
debriefing process:
(1) The length of a good debriefing;
(2) The frequency of the debriefing;
(3) The right timing;
(4) Subjects for maintenance section debriefing;
(5) Attitude toward participation of maintenance officers
in the line/department's debriefing;
(6) The right forum for the debriefing; and
(7) Open-ended question asking for additional comments
and suggestions.
The last questionnaire, namely the questionnaire for
CO ' s and MSC's, was designed to assess their opinions
regarding the above hypotheses, to receive their attitudes
toward the debriefing in general, and to collect their ideas
in terms of practicality, attainability, etc.
Note that the listed hypotheses are not mutually exclu-
sive. Due to their nature, grouping and interpretation may
differ from that presented in this report. This difficulty
is addressed in the analysis, Chapter V.
Most of the questions were designed as closed-ended
statements. The person whose attitudes were being evaluated
-'This hypothesis, obviously, has not been tested in the
three squadron's questionnaire.
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had to circle the "right" numerical choice, on a scale of
zero to five:
= Irrelevant statement;
1 = Statement is totally incorrect;
2 = Statement is incorrect to a great extent;
3 = Statement is partially correct;
4 = Statement is correct to a great extent;
5 = Statement is totally correct.
The following analysis chapter will provide the reader
with an overview of the hypotheses, their relevant questions




The best design to assess the debriefing process would
have been to measure the output of the maintenance section
in squadron #1, and compare it either to its own output
prior to the intervention, or to the output of the control
group(s), assuming other things are equal. Unfortunately,
both these methods could not be used due to the nature of
the study. The reasons were the lack of measurable output
and the absence of an experimental design prior to the
intervention. Therefore, a field study design, along with
an opinion survey, were chosen as the prime methods of this
study.
Two types of questionnaires have been presented in the
last chapter: (1) the three independent samples (comparison
of the three squadrons) ; and (2) the one sample (attitudes
of people in squadron #1, and CO/MSC's attitudes). These
two types were analyzed using different statistical proce-
dures. The basic parameter for the analysis in all the
cases was the median. Among the reasons for choosing the
median rather than the traditional mean were the uncertainty
regarding the normal distribution of the variables being
evaluated, 1 and the fact of limited scale being used in
-'-The sample data appeared to be skewed in many cases
while the sample sizes were a relatively large percentage of
the entire population.
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terms of finite ends which probably "blocked" the distribu-
tion at those points and artificially forced skewed
distribution whenever the central measure tended to be off
the real center (the digit 3 on that scale) . The use of the
median also neutralizes the effect of extreme observations
and seemed to better represent the data observed in the
samples.
Nonparametric statistics have been chosen as the basic
procedure for the data analysis. The reasons for that
choice have been: (1) uncertainty regarding the normality
of the population; and (2) the scale being used was not more
than ordinal 2 in nature. The one sample questionnaire has
been analyzed while looking at the median as the representa-
tive measure of the respective variable. The interpretation
of such a measure, in the absence of comparison, is somewhat
subjective, and attitudes perceived as "highly supportive"
or "weakly supportive" might be interpreted differently.
The interpretation, therefore, has attempted to consider the
entire available data. In the case of the three samples,
analysis of variance was used to compare the scores of the
experimental squadron with the control groups. The
Kruaskal-Wallis test had been chosen as the appropriate
nonparametric test, and had first applied to test the
2 For an excellent discussion about the different
scales, see S. Siegel, 1956, Nonparametric Statistics for
the Behavioral Sciences , McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New
York, pp. 21-29.
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hypothesis that the three squadrons' medians are the same.
Whenever the null hypothesis was rejected (P = .95), a Mann-
Whitney test was applied to test the null hypothesis that
the median of squadron #1 and each of the control squadrons
were the same (P = .99). The Mann-Whitney test was a one
tail test where the alternative hypothesis was that squadron
#l's median is greater than or less than each of the control
squadrons, depending on the case.
The number of responses to each questionnaire varied
with the type of questionnaire. In the questionnaire for
the three squadrons, 4 5 people participated in squadron #1
(N = 45) , 40 people in squadron #2 (N = 40) , and 84 in
squadron #3 (N = 84). In the questionnaire for line/
department enlisted of squadron #1, 45 people have answered
(N = 45). In the questionnaire for LC/DC's of squadron #1,
only eight people have participated (N = 8) , and therefore
the statistical results have been considered carefully.
However, interpretation of those questionnaires have
accounted only for those cases where the median could serve
as a representative measure for the sample distribution by
looking at the histograms, and accounting only for cases
with a standard deviation smaller than .9. The one sample
questionnaire has been interpreted as having a specific
tendency whenever the medians were different than three (the
midpoint) , and the Confidence Intervals (CI) were equal to
or smaller than three digits on the scale of five.
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A. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the following pages, a review of the hypotheses being
tested, their respective guestions, and a discussion
regarding those hypotheses are presented. Each hypothesis
will be presented and discussed separately.
1 . Hypothesis Number (1)
The debriefing is a vehicle for transfer of informa-
tion from top-down and bottom-up within the maintenance
section.
a. Enlisted Questionnaire, Sguadron #1
(1) I would know about other's mistakes at work, even if
there was not a common debriefing. (MED =3),
CI = (3,4), STDV = 1.27.
)
3
(2) The debriefing gives me an opportunity to transfer
information to the MSC. (MED = 3), CI = (3,4), STDV
= 1.32.
)
(3) My LC/DC transfers information to me from MSC. (MED
= 5, CI = (4,5), STDV = .93.)
(4) Since the debriefing process began, I know what is
going on around the sguadron. (MED = 3, CI = (3,4),
STDV = 1.3 3.
)
(5) I trust my LC/DC to convey all the important messages
from our shop to the MSC. (MED =4, CI = (4,5), STDV
= .97. )
(6) The debriefing does not contribute anything for
information transfer among shops in our sguadron.
(MED =2, CI = (1,2), STDV = 1.25.)
3The abbreviations in parentheses stand for the median,
confidence interval, and the standard deviation,
respectively.
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b. Enlisted Questionnaire, Three Squadrons
Comparison
(1) Usually I know immediately about events which take
place in other shops. (#1 < #2, #1 < #3.) 4
(2) I easily relay important issues to my MSC. 5
(3) I feel that all the information the MSC wants me to
receive, I do accept.
(4) I don't know about other shops' problems.
(5) I would like to receive more updates about what is
going on in other shops in my squadron.
c. Line and Department Chiefs (LC/DC) Questionnaire
in Squadron #1 (N = 8)
(1) Since the debriefing process began, the information
flow is better. (MED = 4, CI = (2,5), STDV = .93.)
(2) Information which reaches me in the debriefing did
not reach me before. (MED = 4, CI = (3,5), STDV =
.83. )
(3) I typically transfer to my men the main issues from
the debriefing of the MSC forum. (MED =5, CI =
(4,5) , STDV = .52.
)
(4) The debriefing of the MSC forum does not improve our
knowledge about what's going on. (MED = 1, CI =
(1,4) , STDV = 1.2 5.)
(5) Since the debriefing has been in process I manage to
transfer to the MSC issues that I couldn't transfer
earlier. (MED = 2.5, CI = (1,5), STDV = 1.51.)
(6) Since the debriefing began, I can pass to the MSC
issues that I hardly succeeded in passing earlier.
(MED = 2.5, CI = (2,5), STDV = 1.60.)
4The greater-than or less-than notation along with the
numbers, refers to the squadron's numbers, respectively, and
denotes that squadron #l's median is significantly (P = .99)
greater or less than the respective control squadron (#2,
#3) .
5When nothing appears after the question, it denotes
that no significance (P = .99) has been found.
37
d. Discussion Regarding Hypothesis (1)
The comparison of the three sguadrons has not
revealed any advantage to sguadron #1 over the other two
squadrons. In fact, immediate information about events
taking place in other shops has been perceived to be worse
in that squadron (b.l). 6 However, the enlisted personnel of
squadron #1 have identified some significant roles of the
debriefing with respect to information transfer, namely, the
role of the LC/DC in conveying messages in both directions:
upwards, and downward (a. 3, 5). They have also tended to
reject the statement about the negligible role of debriefing
in contributing to information transfer between shops (a. 6).
The LC/DC s have agreed about their role as information
conveyers (c.3), and have also noted the contribution of the
higher level debriefing, namely, the MSC's forum, to their
awareness of the happenings around the squadron (c.2,4).
The hypothesis about the debriefing being a vehicle for
information transfer has been accepted, although no
significant difference between squadrons could be proven.
An explanation as to the lack of difference might be found
in the too general terms used in that questionnaire.
The relationships between communication and
effectiveness of the group have been addressed by O'Reilly
6The notation (b.l) refers to Section b and question
number 1 within that section. When more than one number
follows the section letter, more than one question has been
cited.
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and Roberts (1977) . They have found that communications
serve as a mediating variable between group structure and
perception of group effectiveness. In that context, the
accuracy of the information transferred has been influenced
by the structure of the organization. One may argue that if
the structure or procedures of the organization enable
better information transfer, it might be expected to find
higher group effectiveness. The debriefing is a procedural
change which has been perceived to enhance the information
transfer. Hence, improvement in effectiveness may be
logically expected.
2 . Hypothesis Number (2)
The debriefing is a tool for mutual learning and
professional enhancement.
a. Enlisted Questionnaire, Squadron #1
(1) I learn new things in debrief ings. (MED =4, CI =
(3,4) , STDV = 1.04.
)
(2) I have nothing to learn in debriefings. (MED = 2 , CI
= (1,2) , STDV = 1.13.)
(3) I have learned the same from others without debrief
-
ings. (MED = 3, CI = (2,4), STDV = 1.2 0.)
(4) I learn from others due to the debriefing. (MED = 3,
CI = (3,4) , STDV = 1.12.
)
(5) My peers want to learn and improve their skills.
(MED =4, CI = (4,4), STDV = .99.)
(6) I learn more from mistakes, rather than successes.
(MED = 2, CI = (2,3), STDV = 1.2 6.)
(7) Our overall performance has been improved since using
















The new recruits learn faster with the debriefing
process. (MED = 4, CI = (3,4), STDV = 1.2 3.)
I make less mistakes since the debriefing process
began. (MED = 3, CI = (2,4), STDV = 1.31.)
The debriefing gives us an opportunity to learn from
each other. (MED = 4, CI = (4,4), STDV = 1.12.)
b. Enlisted Questionnaire, Three Squadron
Comparison
I learn a lot from others' mistakes. (#1 < #2, #1 <
#3.)
Each person learns mainly from his own mistakes.
If I was aware of events and problems of others, I
would make less mistakes.
The new recruits learn the work fast because they
hear and see the seniors.
We learn a lot from each other.
c. Line and Departments Chiefs (LC/DC) Question-
naire in Squadron #1 (N = 8)
I don't learn new things in those debrief ings. (MED
= 1, CI = (1,3), STDV = .79.)
The debriefing creates a good opportunity for mutual
learning. (MED = 4, CI = (4,5), STDV = .49.)
I feel that I am a better LC/DC since the debriefing
process began. (MED = 2, CI = (1,5), STDV = 1.38.)
The LC/DC 's have nothing to learn from each other
through the debriefing. (MED = 1, CI = (1,4), STDV =
1.25.)
The atmosphere in our debriefings is a sort of
learning and willingness for improvement climate.
(MED = 3.5, CI = (3,5), STDV = .74.)
d. Discussion Regarding Hypothesis (2)
The results of both enlisted and LC/DC 's
questionnaires have tended to support the hypothesis of
debriefing as a tool for mutual learning. The learning
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process, as a subject, stands on its own merits. An in-
depth discussion of that process is beyond the scope of this
study. Therefore, no attempt to analyze the aspects of the
learning process have been made. However, some implicit
assumptions, which deserve notice, have been made while
composing the questions. The writer has assumed, as noted
by the questions he had chosen, that the debriefing process
would positively influence mutual learning, the essence of
learning, learning from maintenance errors , and the learning
process of new recruits . However, not all of these learning
aspects have been supported by the data. The formal
hypothesis of mutual learning has been supported by the
enlisted of squadron #1 (a. 10), as well as by LC/DCs of the
same squadron (b.2). Debriefing, as a tool for learning in
general, has been supported by the enlisted of squadron #1
(a. 1,2), and LC/DCs (b.l). However, learning from mainte -
nance errors part, has tended to be rejected by the enlisted
of squadron #1 (a. 6). This tendency may explain why
squadron #1 has had a lower score in another related
question from the three squadrons questionnaire (b.l). This
question (b.l) has included learning from others and
learning from errors. The participants might have perceived
the question's emphasis on the mistakes part and might have
answered respectively.
It is interesting to note that most of the COs
and MSCs have tended to support learning from maintenance
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errors (Appendix: (6) , (8) , (9) ) . The essence of learning
during the debriefing is supported by squadron #l's enlisted
(a.l) and LC/DCs (b.l). New recruits have been perceived to
learn faster due to the debriefing (a. 8).
No support to actual professional enhancement
has been found (a.7,9;b.3) in these opinion data. The
relationships between learning and professional enhancement
may not be so direct or trivial, and therefore, might not
have been recognized by the participants in that case. It
is the writer's opinion that professional enhancement should
occur as a result of learning, in the long run. Beer and
Huse (1972) have found that "effective and permanent
learning comes after the individual had experimented with
new approaches and received appropriate feedback in the on-
the-job situation." (Finding No. 4) Their finding may
explain the recognition of learning in the ongoing squadron
debrief ings. Beer and Huse (1972) have also found that
"rather than T group, the operating, ongoing organization
may be the best 'laboratory' for learning, with fewer
problems in transfer of training." (Finding No. 5) This
finding has reinforced the concept of learning on-the-job,
and the debriefings have already been assessed as a tool for
learning.
The hypothesis about the debriefing as a tool
for mutual learning has been accepted. However, the actual
professional enhancement has not been supported.
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3 . Hypothesis Number (3)
The debriefing is a vehicle for enhancement of
environment and relationships between individuals in the
lines/departments
.
a. Enlisted Questionnaire, Squadron #1
(1) The debriefing contributes to the learning climate in
my shop. (MED = 3.5, CI = (3,4), STDV = 1.15.)
(2) Social tension among people is lower since debrief-
ings are in process. (MED = 3, CI = (2,3), STDV =
1.29.)
(3) I feel comfortable to speak during the debriefing
about my mistakes. (MED = 4, CI = (3,4), STDV =
1.12.
)
(4) There is a great improvement in the relationships
between new recruits and experienced personnel. (MED
=2, CI = (2,3), STDV = 1.18.)
(5) We have helped each other more since the debriefing
process began. (MED =3, CI = (2,4), STDV = 1.30.)
(6) There is no connection between debriefing and morale.
(MED = 3, CI = (3,4), STDV = 1.45.)
b. Enlisted Questionnaire, Three Squadrons
Comparison
(1) I am very pleased with the morale we have (#1 > #2,
#1 > #3.)
(2) The relationships among the guys in my shop are
excellent. (#1 > #2, #1 > #3.)
(3) The relationships among the guys in the whole mainte-
nance section are very good.
(4) The guys willingly help each other at work. (#1 >
#2.)
"
(5) The relationships between seniors and juniors are
very good.
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c. Line and Departments Chiefs (LC/DC) Question-
naire in Squadron #1 (N = 8)
(1) Since the debriefing process began, the work interre-
lationships among LC/DC 's have improved. (MED = 3,
CI = (2,5) , STDV = 1.07.
)
(2) The work interrelationships among the senior person-
nel, have nothing to do with the debrief ings. (MED =
4.5, CI = (4,5), STDV = .89.)
(3) The debrief ings have not changed the working rela-
tionships between the MSC and LC/DC 's. (MED = 4 , CI
= (2,5) , STDV = 1.13.
)
(4) The officers changed their behavior since the




d. Discussion Regarding Hypothesis (3)
Both enlisted personnel and LC/DC s have not
perceived the respective debriefings as improving their
interrelationships (a.4;c.2). The enlisted personnel have
perceived the environment to be free enough and allows one
to speak in public about his own mistakes at work.
It could be hypothesized that the officers would
change their behavior somehow as a result of the exposure to
critics. However, the data have indicated exactly the
opposite (c. 4)
.
Although the enlisted personnel in squadron #1
have not directly indicated an improvement in interrelation-
ships as a result of the debriefing, it is interesting to
note that they have perceived the status of their interrela-
tionships as significantly better than both other squadrons.
This fact might be attributed to other external reasons, but
in light of this study, it has supported the role of the
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debriefing process as hypothesized. The reader should also
notice that squadron #l's enlisted have perceived their
morale as higher than the other two squadrons, as well as
perceiving their mutual collaboration as better than in
squadron #2, and about the same as in squadron #3.
The hypothesis regarding improvement of working
environment and interrelationships due to the debriefing has
been accepted.
4 . Hypothesis Number (4)
The debriefing is a vehicle for enhancement of open-
ness and freedom in expressing concerns.
a. Enlisted Questionnaire, Squadron #1
(1) The debriefing gives me an opportunity to express my-
self on various subjects. (MED =4, CI = (4,5), STDV
= 1.06.
)
(2) I feel free to express myself in the debriefing.
(MED = 5, CI = (4,5), STDV = .77.)
(3) In many cases, the new recruits do not speak during
the debriefing process. (MED =3, CI = (2,4), STDV =
1.44. )
(4) My opinion is always sound during the debriefing
although not popular. (MED = 3, CI = (3,4), STDV =
1.17.
)
(5) In my opinion, not everybody feels free to speak in
the debriefing. (MED = 3, CI = (2,4), STDV = 1.40.)
(6) I could always say whatever I felt, now as well as
before the debriefing process has been established.
(MED =4, CI = (4,5), STDV = 1.33.)
(7) Since the debriefing began my peers started to openly
say how they really feel. (MED = 3, CI = (2,4), STDV
= 1.32.)
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b. Enlisted Questionnaire, Three Squadron
Comparison
(1) I feel free to express myself on every occasion. (#1
> #2, #1 > #3.)
(2) The guys inform the MSC about their personal
problems. (#1 < #3, #1 > #2.)
(3) It is difficult for me to find an opportunity to
express myself to my commanders. (#1 < #2, #1 < #3.)
(4) There are many unpleasant issues I would like to tell
my LC/DC, but I don't find the right occasion. (#1 <
#2, #1 < #3.)
c. Line and Department Chiefs (LC/DC) Question-
naire in Squadron #1 (N = 8)
(1) I feel comfortable to express myself even if my
opinion is different from the MSC's. (MED = 4, CI =
(2,5) , STDV = 1.31.
)
(2) The MSC does not allow us to speak freely in the
debriefing. (MED = 1, CI = (1,1), STDV =0.)
(3) In spite of the debrief ings, not all of the LC/DC 's
feel free to say what they really believe. (MED =
3.5, CI = (1,4), STDV = 1.31.)
(4) The debriefing creates an obligation to speak about
my men's problems and mistakes. (MED =4, CI =
(2,5) , STDV = .99.
)
d. Discussion Regarding Hypothesis (4)
Squadron #1 enlisted personnel have felt free to
express themselves in the debriefing (a. 2), but have noted
that they had that freedom before the debriefing process as
well (a. 6). It is interesting to note that, on the aver-
age, people were much more definitive about themselves and
less definitive about others (a. 5, 7). They have also
indicated that the debriefing creates an opportunity to
change ideas (a.l), whereas the LC/DCs have noted that the
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debriefing has created an obligation to talk about their own
lines/departments' errors (c.4). 7 The three squadron ques-
tionnaire has shown a larger perceived freedom and openness
in squadron #1 (b.l), as well as better opportunities to
inform and discuss problems, opinions or unpleasant issues
with commanders (b.3,4). These questions, however, may
overlap to some extent with the section about information
transfer. Openness of information channels includes both
the physical opportunity, which has been addressed in the
first hypothesis here, and the more intangible openness of
environment. No attempt has been made to completely
separate them from each other. Squadron #1 personnel have
perceived an easier transfer of concerns to the MSC than
squadron #2 and more difficult than squadron #3. These
results may be explained by the MSCs 1 different personali-
ties rather than attributed to other causes.
The hypothesis about the positive contribution
of the debriefing to an enhancement of openness and freedom
in expressing concerns, has been accepted. The debriefing
has seemed to improve the openness of communication between
commanders and subordinates either by formally creating the
opportunity or by shaping the climate. Openness of
7Although the confidence interval is larger than
usually acceptable, reviewing the histogram has revealed
that four people marked number five, three marked number
four, and only one marked number one as the correct answer.
In this case, this observation is assumed as an outlier.
The numbers in the text body include the outlier.
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communication has been found as positively correlated to
group effectiveness (O'Reilly and Roberts, 1977) , and
organizational performance (Indik, et al., 1961, Willits,
1967) . Therefore, higher effectiveness and better work
performance may be expected as a result of the debriefing
process.
5 . Hypothesis Number (5)
The debriefing is an educational tool for honesty,
and admission of maintenance errors.
a. Enlisted Questionnaire, Squadron #1
(1) I always talk about my maintenance errors during the
debriefing. (MED = 4 , CI = (4,5), STDV = 1.05.)
(2) I know about some people who do not mention their
maintenance errors in the debriefing. (MED =2, CI =
(2,3) , STDV = 1.39.
)
(3) I hesitate to tell, during the briefing, about my
maintenance errors. (MED = 1, CI = (1,2), STDV =
.85. )
(4) A person who talks in the debriefing about his main-
tenance errors loses credibility. (MED =2, CI =
(1,2) , STDV = 1.18.)
(5) I think that the debriefing encourages people to
share their maintenance errors with others. (MED =
3, CI = (3,4), STDV = -1.08.)
(6) Due to the debriefing, my peers have started to tell
the truth. (MED = 3, CI = (2,3), STDV = 1.3 0.)
(7) Most of the debriefing participants take advantage of
the debriefing to present themselves in a better
light. (MED = 2, CI = (1,3), STDV = 1.4 0.)
b. Enlisted Questionnaire, Three Squadron
Comparison
(1) It is better not to talk about little maintenance
errors, because one could lose credibility from that.
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(2) I know that not everyone talks about his maintenance
errors. (#1 < #2, #1 < #3.)
(3) I always inform my supervisors about my maintenance
errors.
(4) If the commanders knew the whole truth they would
probably punish us. (#1 > #3.)
(5) Many incidents at work do not reach the MSC. (#1 <
#2.)
c. Line and Departments Chiefs (LC/DC) Question-
naire in Squadron #1 (N = 8)
(1) Not all of the LC/DC s tell the whole truth in the
debriefing. (MED = 3, CI = (1,4), STDV = 1.27.)
(2) Since the debriefing process began, we have started
to talk about issues which were covered before. (MED
= 3.5, CI = (1,5), STDV = 1.3 6.)
(3) The LC/DC who reveals during debriefing his subordi-
nates errors, receives a low grade on the appraisal
because he is actually in charge. (MED =1, CI =
(1,4) , STDV = 1.13.
)
(4) The debriefing process has not changed the honesty
and sincerity of LC/DCs. (MED = 2.5, CI = (1,5),
STDV = 1.4 9.
)
d. Discussion Regarding Hypothesis (5)
The perceived honesty by squadron #1 personnel
is relatively high, at least as far as admitting to mainte-
nance errors at work is concerned (a. 1, 2 , 3 , 4 , 7) . It is the
writer's interpretation that there is a strong positive
relation between admitting to errors and general honesty.
Many of the answers to the above questions were indicative
of this conclusion. Again, the questions regarding others
have not been answered as definitively as those regarding
the self (a. 5, 6). However, the reader should note that
participants have not perceived the debriefing as a
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manipulative tool. Additional support has been provided by
the three squadron's questionnaire, where squadron #1 has
appeared lower in covering maintenance errors (b.2), and
lower than squadron #2 in blocking information from the MSC
(b.5). This questionnaire has also revealed a higher
perceived punishment in squadron #1 than in squadron #3.
This phenomenon might be attributed to the differences in
MSCs 1 characters and is consistent with the previous section
where the same pattern emerged.
No specific pattern emerged in the LC/DC's ques-
tionnaire with regard to that section, but in the previous
section (c.4), additional interpretation of uncovering main-
tenance errors might be given. In the current section,
however, question (c.3) might be attached to the previous
section and is also an indication to the trust participants
have in MSCs honesty when filling the appraisals.
The hypothesis concerning the educational role
of the debriefing to honesty and admission of maintenance
errors is partially accepted. The data have supported the
admission of the maintenance errors' part of the hypothesis.
However, the direct relationship between the admission of
errors and honesty has not been adequately addressed or
shown. As such, the nature of this relationship is not more
than the writer's assumption, and on the basis of that
assumption, admission of errors obviously promotes and
educates toward honesty.
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6 . Hypothesis Number (6)
The debriefing is a tool for performance feedback.
a. Enlisted Questionnaire, Squadron #1
(1) Since the debriefing has been in process, I have a
better idea of what my peers really think of me.
(MED = 2.5, CI = (2,3), STDV = 1.29.)
(2) The debriefing gives me an opportunity to compare my
performance to others. (MED = 3, CI = (3,4), STDV =
1.28.)
(3) Since the debriefing is in process, I know exactly
what my immediate supervisor's opinion is about
myself. (MED = 3 , CI = (2,4), STDV = 1.44.)
(4) It is a shame that our officers do not participate in
our debrief ings. (MED = 2, CI = (1,2), STDV = 1.31.)
(5) I feel that the debriefings allow me to know who is
really a good performer and who is not. (MED = 2 , CI
= (2,3) , STDV = 1.3 0.
)
(6) The debriefing does not contribute to my self esteem,
I have always known my true performance. (MED = 3,
CI = (2,3) , STDV = 1.2 7.
)
(7) The debriefing gives me an opportunity to tell others
when they are wrong. (MED = 3, CI = (3,4), STDV =
1.26. )
b. Enlisted Questionnaire, Three Squadron
Comparison
(1) I know my LC/DC's and MSC's opinion about myself.
(2) The way the MSC appraises me is incorrect because he
does not see me at work.
(3) I always know when I am alright and when I'm not, my
LC/DC always tells me.
(4) I don't know what my peers feel about me.
(5) Everyone in my line/department knows what I feel
about him.
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c. Line and Departments Chiefs (LC/DC) Question-
naire in Squadron #1 (N = 8)
(1) The debriefing creates an opportunity to compare my
line/department to others. (MED = 4, CI = (1,5),
STDV = 1.81.)
(2) Since the debriefing process began I know exactly
what others feel about me. (MED = 1, CI = (1,2),
STDV = .55.)
(3) The debriefing creates an opportunity to acquaint my
peers with my opinions. (MED = 4, CI = (2,5), STDV =
1.03.
)
(4) Before the debriefing process was established, I
always said whatever I thought. (MED = 5, CI =
(4,5) , STDV = .53.)
(5) Since the debriefing process began the LC/DCs feel
more comfortable in telling the truth. (MED =4, CI
= (2,5) , STDV = 1.07.
)
d. Discussion Regarding Hypothesis (6)
The hypothesis about the debriefing role in
performance feedback has not been supported by any of the
above groups. In fact, in some cases participants
explicitly noted the opposite (a.5;c.2). In addition,
enlisted personnel have noted that they preferred to perform
the debriefing sessions without their officers (a. 4). It
seems that they have preferred a more informal and open
environment.
The reader should note that feedback in the
context of the above questions refers solely to one specific
dimension of feedback; namely, the appraisal of the individ-
ual's performance and the extent to which it has been fed
back to the individual. A broader view of feedback has been
discussed in the feedback literature review (Chapter III)
.
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Within the framework of that Chapter I's definitions, the
proposed debriefing is a form of feedback by definition. In
that literature review, some characteristics and attributes
of feedback have been defined, yet not directly addressed in
this field study. Generally speaking, the literature review
has conveyed at least one clear message: The performance
feedback is desirable, although no agreement exists about
its characteristics. The writer has tended to accept the
functional approach to feedback rather than the structural
(Ducan and Bruwelheide, 1986) , and as such, a broad
agreement exists about its positive contribution. If the
broader approach to feedback is accepted, then the
debriefing session is defined as a feedback process and
hence, the debriefing process is desirable.
The surprising reaction of participants to the
feedback capacity of the ongoing debriefing process (in its
narrow context) may be attributed to the subjects which are
currently debriefed. It also can be attributed to the lack
of experience and skill. As noted earlier, the debriefing
of the aircrew's section does serve an important feedback
role (in the narrower context) . Therefore the contradicting
results in the maintenance section are surprising.
The hypothesis about the feedback role of the
debriefing (in its narrow meaning, namely, appraising
individual performance) has not been accepted. In its
broader view, the debriefing is a feedback session by
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definition. Although not directly addressed in this field
study, feedback has been proved to be desirable as noted in
Chapter III.
7 . Hypothesis Number (7)
Participants appreciate the debriefing process in
general.
a. Enlisted Questionnaire, Squadron #1
(1) Most of the debriefing time is wasted on marginal
issues. (MED = 1, CI = (1,2), STDV = 1.16.)
(2) The debriefing wastes time, therefore we finish work
too late. (MED = 1, CI = (1,2), STDV = 1.2 3.)
(3) I don't like the debriefings. (MED = 1, CI = (1,2),
STDV = 1.32.)
(4) Our maintenance-section has improved its performance
since the debriefings have been in process. (MED =
3, CI = (3,4), STDV = 1.3 3.)
(5) Only guys without that high workload have the
time for debriefings. (MED = 1, CI = (1,1), STDV =
.84. )
(6) In general, the debriefing is a good idea. (MED = 4,
CI = (4,5) , STDV = 1.01.
)
(7) Debriefings are not suitable for the maintenance
section, I believe. (MED = 1, CI = (1,2), STDV =
1.25.
)
(8) We work more efficiently as a result of the debrief-
ing process. (MED = 4, CI = (3,4), STDV = 1.11.)
b. Line and Departments Chiefs (LC/DC) Question-
naire in Squadron #1 (N = 8)
(1) Generally speaking, it is better to stay with my
subordinates in the line/department than to waste the
time in the MSC forum debriefing. (MED = 1, CI =
(1,4) , STDV = 1.29.)
(2) The MSC's debriefings do not help very much. It is a
waste of time. (MED = 1, CI = (1,3), STDV = .92.)
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(3) I don't learn new things in the debriefing. (MED = 1,
CI = (1,3) , STEV = .78.
)
(4) I believe that the LC/DC's teamwork has improved due
to the debriefing. (MED = 2, CI = (2,5), STDV =
1.46.
)
(5) I think the atmosphere in our squadron has not been
changed due to the debrief ings. (MED = 3, CI =
(2,5) , STDV = 1.13.)
c. Discussion Regarding Hypothesis (7)
The general appraisal part to the debriefing
process is the most prominent in its trend, namely, the high
appreciation for the debriefing process. Generally speak-
ing, the enlisted have believed that it is not a waste of
time (a.2,5;b.l) 8 and the time has not been wasted on
marginal issues (a.l). LC/DCs have felt that the debriefing
has contributed somehow (b.2), and they have learned new
things during their debriefings (b.3). Enlisted personnel
have been extremely satisfied (a. 3,7) with their debriefings
and have perceived their performance at work as more effi-
cient (a. 8). As a summary of their attitudes toward the
debriefing process, the enlisted have indicated that it has
been a good idea (a. 6).
The data presented have shown an extremely
positive attitude of the enlisted personnel toward the
ongoing debriefing process, and a tendency to recognize the
efficiency of debriefings in terms of time usage. Hence,
8Although the confidence interval is too large to be
usually acceptable, the histogram shows that five responses
were as high as five, one marked four as the correct answer,
and one marked the three option. It is believed that a
positive trend has emerged from that data.
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the hypothesis regarding participants' positive attitudes
has been accepted.
8 . Technical Procedures
Procedural aspects of the debriefing are addressed
below.
a. Length of a Good Debriefing Session
The perceived good debriefing session should
last about 20 minutes (STDV = 1.036). However, Prue and
Fairbank (1981) have stated that the feedback duration is a
function of the content and the mechanism employed. There-
fore, the 2 minutes length should be taken only in the
context of the ongoing debriefing. If any change is to
occur in content or mechanism used (mechanical devices or
the like) , the length of the debriefing may be changed
accordingly.
b. Freguency of the Debriefing
The debriefing should take place every day (STDV
= 1.54). The most consistent effectiveness has been found
by Balcazar et al., (1986) to be relatively immediate feed-
back. This finding may support the desired freguency as
noted by participants.
c. Appropriate Timing
The appropriate time for debriefing is when the
last flight has landed each day (STDV = .88).
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d. Subjects for Maintenance Section Debriefing
The subjects for debriefings have been addressed
in the open-ended part of the LC/DC's, enlisted, and Co/
MSC's questionnaire, and a summary of the answers is
provided here. Most of squadron #l's enlisted personnel
have noted that problems and maintenance errors within and
between shops should be debriefed, as well as major
malfunctions and the way they had been treated. Many
enlisted have noted the need to debrief the work procedures
in terms of requirements vs. actual performance,
informational type issues such as events in other shops, and
more soft type issues such as social interrelationships,
relations between air-crews and maintenance-crews, people
feelings, work environment, etc.
The CO * s and MSCs have emphasized the need to
debrief the daily tasks and timing fulfillments, exceptional
events, major malfunctions and their treatments, daily
routine management and the like. One of them has noted that
opening the stage for general discussion at the end of the
session is desirable.
Three out of the seven LC/DCs have added that
their debriefing with the MSC should be shorter, to enable
them to meet with their subordinates for the immediate relay
of the information.
The feedback literature which has been reviewed
earlier has supported most of the recorded results.
57
According to the literature, a notice should be given to the
submission of accurate and specific information about per-
formance in quantitative figures, if possible. A comparison
of actual performance to standards is recommended by both
the literature and participants.
e. Attitude Toward Participation of Maintenance
Officers in the Line/Department's Debriefing
Participation of officers in the line/depart-
ments' debriefings has been strongly rejected by the
enlisted personnel. The identity of the participants in a
feedback session is a subject which has been addressed in
the feedback literature review. According to that litera-
ture, the performer (s) should participate. However, the
publicity of feedback is a function of many factors; such as
the sensitivity of the messages, the number of performers,
openness and climate, etc. Participants in the debriefing
session obviously consider who are the other participants
before they "speak their minds" in that forum. These
factors should be taken into consideration.
f. The Right Forum for the Debriefing
Almost all responses to that question, including
CO/MSCs, have agreed that regular forums must consist of
lines and departments respectively, and LC/DCs with officers
as a higher level forum for debriefing. Some enlisted noted
the need for comprehensive debriefing for the entire mainte-
nance section on a weekly basis.
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The previous section (concerning participants of
a debriefing session) is assumed to be closely related to
this section.
g. Open-ended Question Asking for Additional
Comments and Suggestions
Most of the comments by other enlisted personnel
have been addressed in the sections above. However, CO/MSCs
have viewed the idea very positively and have determined it
to have the following advantages: (1) improvement of main-
tenance standards; (2) mutual learning; (3) better openness,
morale, and working climate; and (4) cohesiveness. It is
interesting to note that one MSC had amplified the problem
of maintenance personnel with respect to the way they
regularly debrief performance and react to maintenance
errors at work, and has recognized the debriefing process as
a tool to educate the people in a desired direction.
As to the "cost-benefit" side of the proposed
debriefing, most of the CO/MSCs have viewed the idea posi-
tively, although the "right" frequency has varied across
squadrons, and skepticism about the practicality of the
idea, have been expressed by squadron #3's CO.
B. GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, an attempt to identify and test some of
the attributes and the characteristics of the debriefing
process has been made. As in the case of feedback, the
ability or the need to analyze and understand the separate
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components of the debriefing process may not be the most
important issue. If the debriefing is accepted as a feed-
back session, it might be suggested as in the case of
feedback, to look at the debriefing 's outcomes and effects
rather than its structural aspects.
One might view the debriefing as "quality circles." The
participation of employees for improvements is encouraged.
The group discussion is a means for enhancement, and the
future performance and quality are the targeted issues while
assessing past performance or situations. Reliance on
participants' collaboration is crucial for effectiveness and
as such, an open climate is vital for success. However,
some differences exist. The quality circles are a voluntary
activity whereas the debriefing is not. The scope of the
quality circles is limited to enhancement of quality whereas
the scope of the debriefing is broader. The most signifi-
cant difference may be the principle of quality circles;
namely, using the talents of the employees to improve the
product and productivity, whereas the principle of debrief-
ing is to improve and educate the participants themselves,
in hopes of a positive outcome.
Communication aspects of the debriefing have been
mentioned in the discussion regarding the transfer role and
the openness enhancement role of the debriefing. The
debriefing, as mentioned, creates an opportunity to communi-
cate. One might attribute the overall strong favorable
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attitude toward the debriefing to the improvement in
openness of communication. The correlation between openness
of communication and performance was addressed by Jablin
(1979) . He has concluded that the better the communication,
the higher the satisfaction. He has emphasized the openness
of communication between superiors and subordinates, and the
favorite impact of open communication on both parties. He
has also noted that face-to-face communication is the most
satisfactory type of communication. The above discussion
may very well explain the favorite attitudes of participants
toward the debriefing sessions. The same logic may also
support the idea of the debriefing as a tool to enhance
performance.
The influence on behavior is not only in the downward
direction. The literature has indicated that influence goes
in both directions (Podaskoff, 1982; Jablin, 1979). Upward
communications have been traditionally perceived as more
problematic in terms of ability to communicate and openness.
The debriefing obviously creates a situation where upward
communication is more likely to happen. This, in turn, may
satisfy subordinates, influence behavior of both parties,
and promote quality performance.
Greller and Herold (1975) suggested that the quality of
the feedback source is a function of the psychological
proximity between the source and the subjected person.
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Other researchers (Ivancevich and McMahon, 1982) have found
the "self" as a higher efficient source of feedback.
It is suggested to employ the self-debriefing method in
the debriefing sessions as the prime method. This strategy
is successfully employed by the aircrew sections, and
logically would serve as an educational tool for honesty in
the maintenance sections as well. General Amos Lapidot, the
previous IAF commander, has mentioned:
Above and beyond the excellent manpower we have in the
IAF, our debriefing culture should be noted. This culture
consists of honest debriefing, accurate, objective, and
without "stories" .. .the basic education is in the squadron
level; when the debriefing session starts, the pilot says:
"my mistakes today were such and such." First he notes
his own mistakes. This is the best education to get
improved and to know the exact truth every moment, without
wishful thinking facts, I believe. (Ben-Akiva, 1988)
His predecessor, General David Ivry, has said in the same
symposium:
The IAF ability to debrief every flying cadet and pilot is
an extremely high qualitative dimension. It begins in the
education of the officers who latter become commanders,
and requires such debriefing from others. This is a
unique process to the IAF. (Ben-Akiva, 1988)
The last two quotes demonstrate, maybe more than anything
else, the attitude of the highest level command to the
debriefing concept in general, and to the process of self-
debriefing , in particular. The principles underlying the
aircrews debriefing may be valid in the case of the mainte-
nance section as well, is the writer's belief. If that is
the case, there is no reason why the debriefing process
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would not be adopted to all maintenance sections throughout
the IAF.
C. SUMMARY
In this chapter, hypotheses regarding the ongoing
debriefing processes have been tested and questions
concerning their results have been presented and discussed
along with the relevant theories. The field study hypothe-
ses and their respective interpretations are summarized
below:
(1) The debriefing is a vehicle for the transfer of
information from the top-down and bottom-up within
the maintenance section. This hypothesis has been
accepted.
(2) The debriefing is a tool for mutual learning and pro-
fessional enhancement. The mutual learning part has
been accepted and the professional enhancement part
has not been accepted.
(3) The debriefing is a vehicle for enhancement of the
working environment and the relationships between
individuals in the lines/departments. This hypothe-
sis has been accepted.
(4) The debriefing is a vehicle for enhancement of open-
ness and freedom in expressing concerns. This
hypothesis has been accepted.
(5) The debriefing is an educational tool for honesty and
admission of maintenance errors. The part regarding
the admission of maintenance errors has been accepted
and the part regarding the educational tool for
honesty has not been adequately addressed, and
therefore, only assumed to be true.
(6) The debriefing is a tool for performance feedback.
This hypothesis has not been accepted. However,
performance feedback has been interpreted in both
narrow and broad senses, and it has been argued that
the debriefing in its broad sense is a form of
feedback by definition, and as such—desirable.
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(7) Participants appreciate the debriefing process in
general. The hypothesis has been accepted with
rigorous confidence.
Some procedural aspects and their outcomes have been
addressed and the following general subjects have been
discussed:
(1) Viewing the debriefing as a whole rather than parti-
tioning it by its characteristics;
(2) Comparison of quality circles with the debriefing;
(3) Communication and debriefing; and
(4) The self-feedback as a normal routine in debriefing.
On the basis of the above analysis, conclusions and
recommendations will be offered in the last chapter. The
implementation stage of the debriefing, based on the
positive general attitude discussed here, will follow this.
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VI. IMPLEMENTING THE DEBRIEFING PROCESS,
MANAGING THE CHANGE
A. LITERATURE REVIEW
Organizational change can be viewed from several per-
spectives. One can look at the overall organization and
apply a systematic analysis to the problems which leads to a
major organizational change. This type of change is
typically referred to as a strategic change. Strategic
change has been discussed and analyzed thoroughly in Tichy's
book (1983), Managing Strategic Change . Tichy views the
organization as composed of three systems: technical,
political and cultural. According to his approach,
strategic change should include an intervention in each of
these three systems separately. The organizational strate-
gy, structure and the like, may be used to align the three
systems with each other and with the larger environment.
Harvey and Brown (1988, p. 391) have illustrated Tichy's
concept using the "Environmental Forces and Organizational
Systems" model (Figure 1)
.
Harvey and Brown (1988, p. 154) concur with Tichy
(1983), using somewhat different terms: "Changing an organ-
ization involves modifying existing organizational systems,
structure, and culture to some different standard or level
of performance."
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Source: From N. Tichy, "Strategic Change
Management" (Working Paper, GSBA, The
University of Michigan, April 1982), p
17.
Figure 1. Environmental Forces and Organizational Systems
Focusing on a smaller part of the organization, one
could look at the sub-organization as an independent entity,
as far as strategic change is concerned. When the change
becomes more and more local and narrow in nature, the title
"strategic" becomes somewhat "operational." Most organiza-
tions are composed of sub-units where changes may take
place. Limiting the scope of an intended change to more
minor ones may create some ambiguity and confusion regarding
the definition of "Strategic Change."
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Beer and Huse (1972) have suggested a model for organi-
zational change (Figure 2). This model views the organiza-
tion as an "open system which, from the human point of view,
converts individual needs and expectations into outputs."
(Beer and Huse, 1972) They have suggested that organiza-
tional performance may be improved through an improvement of
the conversion process (i.e., better utilization of the
human potential) , as opposed to an improvement due to better
inputs (i.e., higher quality of personnel).
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Figure 2. Systems Model of an Organization
Different approaches to organizational change are
presented in the literature. Harvey and Brown (1988, p.
198) have identified three basic approaches: structural,
67
technical and behavioral. They have emphasized the need for
integrated interventions to bring about a successful change.
Selfridge and Sokolik (1975) have suggested the comprehen-
sive approach, encompassing technical, structural and behav-
ioral aspects of the system. They have proposed the
"iceberg" analogy to OD, composed of two groups of compon-
ents: the easily observable portion (overt) and the more
hidden parts (covert) (see Figure 3). They have stressed
the need to look at all the components of the organization
when dealing with a change.
They have emphasized that one often examines only the
overt and visible aspects of the organization and fails to
consider the more hidden problem areas. Their model
presents both the overt and covert components which should
be considered in the diagnosis phase.
Most writers are looking at change as a transition from
one existing state to another desirable one. Tichy has
emphasized the systems and the processes involved, while
Harvey and Brown (1988) have summarized various approaches
while concentrating on the OD consultant role in the proc-
ess. Beckhard and Harris (1972) have tended to be concerned
more with the transition itself without limiting the discus-
sion to any sort of change in particular.
Looking at the OD Process offered by Harvey and Brown
(Figure 4), we can identify the basic steps of the change





























































Source: Adapted from Richard J. Selfridge and
Stanley L. Sokolik, "A Comprehensive View
of Organizational Development," M. S .U
.
Business Topics , Winter 1975, p. 47.
Figure 3 . The "Organization Iceberg" Approach to OD


























Source: (Harvey and Brown, p. 197)
Figure 4 . The OD Process
Although different authors differ somewhat in the terms
or order of implementation they suggest, they basically
agree on the principals. Looking at "The Change Management
Process" model of Beckhard and Harris (Figure 5) , we can
identify these similarities. The model presented here is a
summary overview of the stages and points described in their
analysis.
The Beckhard and Harris (1987) model enables one to
restrict the focus even further and concentrate solely on
the Transition phase, which is the main focus of this paper.
More specific discussion will be devoted to the two areas
emphasized in the rectangles at the bottom, namely, "Getting
from Here to There" and "Managing During the Transition
State."
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Potency of demands for change
Nature of demands on system Source of demands for change
Why changer
Determining the need for change
Determining the degree of choice
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Figure 5. The Change Management Process
Tichy (1983) believes that the transition state
"consists of predicting, channeling, guiding, and altering
the technical, political, and cultural cycles in order to
arrive at the desired state strategy." (Tichy, 1983, p.
333)
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Beckhard and Harris (1987) are much more specific and
practical, and suggest several alternative structures for
managing the transition (Beckhard and Harris, 1987, p. 76):
The Chief Executive—who is personally involved and
manages the change.
The Project Manager—who receives his power from the CEO.
The Hierarchy— is an approach which consists of additional
responsibility to the regular operation managers.
Representatives of Constituencies—where a group of repre-
sentatives from each relevant area manage the change.
"Natural" Leaders—usually as close as possible to the
actual change and are willing to commit themselves to that
change.
The "Kitchen Cabinet"—where the CEO has a few colleagues
who informally meet and discuss work problems.
A great deal of attention has been paid in the litera-
ture to the question of how to manage the transition stage.
Rogers (1983) has examined the characteristics of the
innovation and assessed the characteristics of the early
adopters as well as the change agent. He has suggested the
following attributes of innovations, and emphasized the
importance of the individual's perception of these charac-
teristics (Rogers, 1983, p. 238).
Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation
is perceived as better than the idea it supercedes. The
relative advantage of an innovation, as perceived by members
of a social system, is positively related to its rate of
adoption.
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Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is
perceived as consistent with the existing values, past
experiences and needs of potential adopters. The compati-
bility of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social
system, is positively related to its rate of adoption.
Complexity is the degree to which an innovation is
perceived as relatively difficult to understand and to use.
The complexity of an innovation, as perceived by members of
a social system, is negatively related to its rate of
adoption.
Trialability is the degree to which an innovation may be
experimented with on a limited basis. The trialability of
an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system,
is positively related to its rate of adoption.
Observability is the degree to which the results of an
innovation are visible to others. The observability of an
innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is
positively related to its rate of adoption.
Rogers (1983, pp. 257-258) has tried to categorize the
personality variables of the early adopters:
(1) Earlier adopters have greater empathy than later
adopters.
(2) Earlier adopters may be less dogmatic.
(3) Earlier adopters have a greater ability to deal with
abstraction.
(4) Earlier adopters have greater rationality.
(5) Earlier adopters have greater intelligence.
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(6) Earlier adopters have more favorable attitude toward
change.
(7) Earlier adopters are more able to cope with
uncertainty and risk.
(8) Earlier adopters have a more favorable attitude
toward education.
(9) Earlier adopters have a more favorable attitude
toward science.
(10) Earlier adopters are less fatalistic.
(11) Earlier adopters have a higher level of achievement
motivation.
(12) Earlier adopters have higher aspirations.
Rogers (1983, p. 343) has also found that a change
agent's relative success in securing the adoption of innova-
tion by clients is positively related to:
(1) The extent of change agent effort in contacting
clients.
(2) A client-orientation.
(3) The degree to which the diffusion program is compati-
ble with clients' needs.
(4) The change agent's empathy with client.
(5) His or her homophily with clients.
(6) Credibility in the client's eyes.
(7) The extent to which he or she works through opinion
leaders
.
(8) Increasing climate's ability to evaluate innovations.
Harvey and Brown (1988, p. 85) have compared the
advantages and disadvantages of internal and external
consultants, but did not devote much discussion to changes
to be achieved by a different type of change agent such as a
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member of the organization or an internal group. They did,
however, mention the supervisor as an internal consultant,
and throughout their book, external consultant and OD
approach are interchangeable.
According to their method, organizational readiness for
change is a prerequisite for a successful OD program. They
have listed Bennis' four questions to be asked by the
consultant before venturing further (Harvey and Brown, 1988,
p. 91):
(1) Are the learning goals of OD appropriate?
(2) Is the cultural state of the client system ready for
organization development?
(3) Are the key people involved?
(4) Are members of the client system adequately prepared
and oriented to organization development?
Their discussion has devoted a great deal of attention
to the involvement and cooperation of top management before
such change could be initiated. They have not addressed,
however, the question or situation where no such commitment
exists or where one or more of the above questions is
negatively answered.
Beer and Huse (1972), on the other hand, found that:
(1) A clear-cut commitment to a particular OD approach is
not necessary (although desirable) for a successful
OD program to succeed.
(2) Total top management understanding of where the OD
process will lead and the state of the organization
at the end of that process is not necessary for
organizational change to occur.
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(3) Change can and does begin at lower levels in the
organization. (partial list of findings)
Rogers (1983, p. 334) has also found that "innovations
often bubbled up from the operational levels of a system,
with the inventing done by certain users," and hence, has
reinforced Beckhard and Huse's findings.
A variety of intervention techniques are available to
the change agent whether he or she is an OD practitioner,
manager or a member in the organization. Harvey and Brown
(1988, p. 207) have listed many of those technigues (Figure
6).
Personal and Interpersonal Team Inlcrgroup Total Organization System
|ob design Team building Intergroup development Management by objectives
|ob enrichment Process consultation Third-party intervention Goal selling
Laboratory learning |ob enrichment Organization mirror Grid OD (phases 4, 5, and 6)
Career planning |ob design Process consultation Survey (eedhac k
Goal setting Quality circles Grid OD (phase J) Ac lion research
Managerial Grid (phase I) Role negotiation Likert's System 4
Stress management Role analysis technique Qualily of work life
Biofeedback Grid OD (phase 2) Decentralization
Figure 6. OD Interventions: An Overview
Beckhard and Harris (1987) have suggested (p. 74) : "In
targeting an initial intervention, one must identify the
most promising early activities and carefully think through
their consequences." They also offer some general possible
interventions as well as "strongly recommend that the choice
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of technology for managing the change be a later rather than
an early decision."
The question of where to intervene first is addressed by
Beckhard and Harris (1987, p. 73). They have listed the
following:
(1) Top management;
(2) Management ready systems;
(3) "Hurting" systems—where acute problems exist;
(4) New teams or systems;
(5) Staff;
(6) Temporary project systems.
They have argued that no "cook book" exists for that choice,
however "if one asks questions systematically, one is likely
to come up with better judgments and better choices than
otherwise.
"
Beckhard and Harris (1987) have stressed the need for
leadership in carrying out a change, especially in terms of
personal commitment to the change. A sort of "practices
what it preaches."
Beer and Huse (1972) found that "the real potential in
organizational development lies in setting in motion such a
positive snowball of change, growth, and development." In
other words, changes could be initiated in any source within
the organization, and be expanded around, if the right
conditions and right actions are taken.
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Resistance to changes is one of the major obstacles for
a successful change. Harvey and Brown (1988, pp. 161-163)
have identified the sources of resistance as:
(1) Fear of the unknown;
(2) Disruption of routine;
(3) Loss of existing benefits;
(4) Threat to position power;
(5) Conformity to norms and culture.
Tichy (1983, pp. 344-345) has listed the following reasons:
(1) Resistance due to habit;
(2) Resistance due to fear of the unknown;
(3) Resistance due to absence of skills;
(4) Organization predictability (parallels to individual
resistance due to habit)
;
(5) Resistance due to sunk costs.
While assessing the current situation regarding the
degree of the expected resistance, a change agent may use






















Figure 7. The Change Model
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The "culture" is identified by Harvey and Brown (1988,
p. 64) as "a system of shared values and beliefs which
interact with an organization's people, structure, and
systems to produce behavioral norms (the way things are done
around here)." Often the terms "culture," "climate," and
"norms" are not well distinguished from each other in novice
minds. As opposed to the above definition, "climate" is
defined by Hellriegel and Slocum (1974, p. 156) as "a set of
attributes which can be perceived about a particular organi-
zation and/or its subsystems, and that may be induced from
the way that organization and/or its subsystems deal with
their members and environment." Culture is usually
concerned with long term strategy and, therefore, is more
difficult to change, whereas climate refers to a shorter
term and measures the fit between the prevailing culture and
the individual values of the employee.
"Norms" are defined by Muchinsky (1987, p. 358) as
"shared group expectations about appropriate behavior."
An appropriate background work as well as facilitation
during the change process is highly recommended. Harvey and
Brown (1988, p. 164) have listed the methods for dealing
with resistance to change (Figure 8)
.
The above literature review sought to shed some light on
the theoretical framework of the proposed change. Many of
the surveyed concepts and approaches will be used in assess-
ing the current situation, considering structural and social
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6. Explicit & Implicit
Coercion
There is a lack of
information or inaccurate
information and analysis.
The initiators do not
have all the information
they need to design the






Some person or group with
considerable power to resist
will clearly lose out in a
change.
Other tactics will not work,
or are too expensive.




will often help implement
the change.
People who participate
will be committed to
implementing the
change, and any relevant
information they have will
be integrated into the
change plan
No other approach works
as well with adjustment
problems.
Sometimes it is a relatively
easy way to avoid major
resistance.
It can be a relatively quick
and inexpensive solution to
resistance problems.
It is speedy and can
overcome any kind of
resistance.
Can be very lime
consuming if many
people are involved.




Can be time consuming,
expensive, and still fail.
Can be too expensive if it
alerts others to negotiate for
compliance.
Can lead to future problems
if people feel manipulated.
Can be risky if it leaves
people angry with the
initiators.
Source: Harvard Business Review . An exhibit from
"Choosing Strategies for Change," by John
A. Kotter and Leonard A. Schlesinger,
March/April 1979.
Figure 8. Methods for Dealing with Resistance to Change
factors, and evaluating ways to successfully implement the
change, namely the debriefing process.
B. THE ACTUAL SUGGESTED TRANSITION MANAGEMENT
Based on the theory and the writer's experience, and
within the concepts, approaches and definitions briefly
described earlier, a discussion about the implementation
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aspects of the debriefing process in the maintenance
sections of the IAF will be offered.
According to the traditional approach supported by
Harvey and Brown (1988), a total understanding and
commitment of the highest command levels is necessary before
an attempt to implement such change throughout the entire
IAF may be initiated. The writer is in favor of the Beer
and Huse's (1972) approach because of: (1) their findings
regarding the possible successful change without such
commitment (noted earlier); (2) the writer's long experience
in the Israeli Air Force has shown that fruitful innovations
do stem from the bottom and can have a snowball effect,
horizontally and vertically throughout the entire air force.
As noted earlier, this approach is also supported by Rogers
(1983) .
A squadron is a relatively independent unit and has the
ability to carry out changes such as the proposed debriefing
in a successful manner. Knowing the climate and culture of
a squadron, the writer believes that the change agent must
be internal. In most cases the squadron commander (CO) and
the Maintenance Section Commander (MSC) have the necessary
credibility and most of the other characteristics noted
earlier in Rogers' lists, to successfully play the role of
the change agent. Looking back at the "Alternative Struc-
tures" of Beckhard and Harris (1987) described earlier, it
is suggested that "The Hierarchy" structure be used for
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managing that transition, namely, the existing chain of
command of the squadron. For the entire IAF, the "bottom-
up" concept is still valid, although not recommended for the
squadron level. Any position below the MSC level may not
have sufficient power for a successful change.
1 . Evaluation of the Current Situation
Using Harvey and Brown's (1988, p. 154) model
(Figure 9) , a discussion of the forces to be considered
while instituting the change, is offered below.
Consultant
1 '
Time Success of Change Degree of Change
, .
Impact on Culture
Figure 9. Change Forces
The consultant (change agent) , who is the CO or MSC
in this case, has a tremendous influence on the outcomes.
The "Degree of Change" is not very large in terms of the
structural/procedural aspects, but has high impact on the
culture . Thus a great deal of attention should be paid to
that factor. The "Time Frame" can not be too long because
of the nature of the change. Once the preparations are
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completed and the process has been started, the maintenance
of momentum should be stressed and facilitated.
As previously noted, resistance is a major obstacle
to any change and toward a cultural one in particular.
Reviewing Harvey and Brown's (1988) model (Figure 7), the
writer would place the debriefing process in the upper left
corner which consists of some resistance and moderate chance
of success. It brings about the unavoidable conclusion that
a careful analysis , planning and implementation should be
undertaken. Beckhard and Harris (1987, p. 95) have
suggested the Commitment Chart (Figure 10) which the change
agent may use for a better visualized analysis of the key
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Figure 10. Sample Commitment Chart
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In Figure 10, "X" stands for the present degree of
commitment, and "O" indicates the minimum necessary commit-
ment for the change to occur. The arrows represent the work
required.
In his efforts to ensure as much commitment as
possible, the change agent may adopt the "Personality
Variables" of the early adopters as suggested by Rogers
(1983) and reviewed earlier.
"A major factor in resistance to innovation is that
reorganization invariably implies a redistribution of power
and influence." (Harvey and Brown, 1988, p. 162) Exposure
of key players such as MSC, LC/DC and Crew Chiefs to
possible adverse comments and criticism from peers and
subordinates may be threatening enough to discourage their
collaboration. However, their collaboration is a crucial
factor for the program to succeed .
A critical mass of the above key players should be
assembled to assure forward movement of the "snowball." The
writer's experience shows that the vast majority of the
LC/DC s must be committed to the change to ensure success.
Assessment of the innovation itself, using Rogers'
"Innovation Characteristics" (Rogers, 1983, p. 238) shows
the following analysis.
Relative Advantage: Although the relative advantage
is sound, the writer believes that participants in the
program may not foresee it at first glance. Information to
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ensure total comprehension of the idea, the principles, and
the implicit thrust of the problem on issue should be
transferred and shared across the lines and along the
processes.
Compatibility: Is pretty good with the existing
structured procedures, but some adjustments still may take
place and affect the existing routines. As far as the
cultural aspect of the change is concerned, it is more like
a mind-set revolution than a small shift.
Complexity: Again, the mind-set change is complex,
and assessment efforts should be dedicated to it.
Trialability : It is not one of the physical
innovations which one can try once and then make up his
mind. A complete commitment to the change by the key
players must be incorporated with the decision to "try"
(implement)
.
Observability: Is not sufficient in terms of real
observation. On the other hand, success or failure in one
squadron will probably be conveyed to other squadrons
through the formal and informal channels available.
2 . Suggested Strategy
As noted throughout the readings, a great deal of
emphasis should be devoted to the cultural and working
climate issues. The writer is strongly convinced that the
key for successful implementation of the debriefing process
is really hiding in these factors. Most of the efforts,
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therefore, should be directed toward them. "Most managers
underestimate the amount of communication needed, so it is
better to use 'overkill' than to understate the situation."
(Harvey and Brown, 1988, p. 164)
Potential resistance should be recognized and
treated at every possible front. There is not "only one
right way" to successfully overcome resistance. The change
agent may make use of the models listed above, and determine
his own way, consistently, with his assessment of the
situation. The writer, however, would choose the first
three methods listed in Harvey and Brown's (1988) table
(Figure 8). It is strongly recommended to emphasize
participation and involvement . These factors have been
proven practically over and over again as efficient and
promising means of gaining commitment (Harvey and Brown,
1988, pp. 164-165, 312-313; Stoner and Wankel, 1986, p. 359;
Beer and Huse, 1972) .
Participation could be encouraged by simply using
the subordinates' experience, expertise and creativity to
discuss the issue and its technical aspects such as methods
to use, routines, schedules, procedures, etc.
Note, collaboration of key players is crucial!
Assessment and facilitation of the process is vital all
along. Periodic meetings of the CO with the MSC and the
LC/DC's to "debrief the debriefing" is highly recommended on
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a monthly basis at the beginning. This routine may enhance
the participation and "ownership" of feelings as well.
Collaboration may be insured by inviting key players
such as LC/DCs to occasionally participate in the aircrews'
mass debriefing. This may demonstrate to them how a good
debriefing should be performed, and may help them to realize
the desirable degree of openness, honesty and idea sharing.
Once a decision to implement the process has been
made, it should be properly announced as the goal of the
squadron for the coming training term. It should be
properly emphasized in the weekly schedule, and assured that
it actually be done as scheduled. At the run-up phase,
first priority should be assigned to it.
Encouragement of natural leaders among the personnel
and ensuring their collaboration could be extremely helpful.
This can be done by face-to-face interviews either by the CO
or the MSC. Beer and Huse (1972, Finding No. 6), have
emphasized that practice as well as "Internal change leaders
are natural targets for the change agent, since they become
influence leaders and help to shape the culture."
Encouragement during the process is a good practice.
As Harvey and Brown (1988) have noted (Figure 8, Approach
#3), Facilitation and support are important to assist in
adjusting behavior and attitudes. It is recommended to meet
with considerable frequency with the LC/DCs, and let them
evaluate their performance as debriefing leaders. It is
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suggested that they discuss their difficulties, thoughts,
and feelings; to encourage and support, to provide backing
and to share their own experience. The LC/DCs certainly
need such support at that stage.
Expectations should not exceed what is realistic.
"Organization change occurs in stages: a stage of unfreez-
ing and trust building, a take-off stage when observable
change occurs, and a re-stabilization stage. Then the cycle
iterates." (Beer and Huse, 1972, Finding #7) Although the
debriefing process may run smoothly from the technical
perspective, real internal quality may not be expected to be
high at the beginning. These changes take time. Confidence
should be built and cultural change should occur, therefore,
patience and faith are needed. The change agent should keep
in mind that the proposed pilot program has already been
implemented and in fact, enlisted, as well as the squadron
commanders, like it.
C . SUMMARY
The debriefing process has been suggested for the
maintenance sections of the Israeli Air Force squadrons.
The implementation stage of such a process, including
several problems such as resistance, lack of collaboration,
and other structural and cultural problems, have been
discussed.
A literature review has been presented and the theories
which may be useful when considering the change have been
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presented. The actual situation of the Israeli Air Force
has been examined and some suggestions for the implementa-
tion have been presented.
The main steps to be taken consist of:
(1) The need to consider environmental and cultural
variables.
(2) The need to achieve commitment of key players.
(3) The need to ensure participation and to provide
encouragement and support.
(4) The need to develop realistic expectations and to be
sufficiently patient.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The objectives of this chapter are to summarize the
major findings across the research questions, to draw
conclusions out of these findings and to recommend a course
of action. The conclusions will be related to the survey
findings and to the theory presented.
The questions addressed in this study are:
(1) What is the role of the debriefing process in the
maintenance sections?
(2) What are the debriefing structure, forums, frequency,
and subjects?
(3) What are the attitudes of targeted sectors toward the
suggested procedure?
(4) What are the organizational changes and concerns to
be considered when implementing this change?
A. CONCLUSIONS
1 . The Role of the Debriefing Process in the Mainte-
nance Sections
Six hypotheses regarding the role of the ongoing
debriefing have been tested. The debriefing process for the
IAF maintenance sections serves as a tool for information
transfer in both directions across the chain of command, and
serves as a tool for mutual learning, for better learning of
new recruits and for improvement of the essence of learning.
The debriefing also serves as a tool to enhance the organi-
zational environment and interrelationships, as a vehicle
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for enhancement of openness and freedom in expressing
concerns, and as an educational tool for honesty. The above
conclusions have been drawn out of the opinion survey. In
addition, debriefing serves as a tool for feedback in its
broader context, namely "information return related to an
output" (Murrell, 1975), motivational function (Annet, 1969;
Vroom, 1964) , and learning or informational function (Vroom,
1964)
.
These are by no means the only roles of the
debriefing. These are the only roles which have been
addressed in this research, and further research may find or
identify additional roles. It has been concluded that the
above roles are not mutually exclusive, hence, determination
of cause and effect relationships require more research.
2 . The Debriefing Structure, Forums, Frequency and
Discussion Subjects
The appropriate length of a debriefing for the line/
department personnel is about 20 minutes, on a daily basis.
The proper time is when the last flight has landed. The
appropriate forums for the debrief ings are: (1) the entire
personnel of the line or department headed by its LC/DC; and
(2) the LC/DCs with the maintenance officers headed by the
MSC. No officers should participate in the line/department
debriefing.
The subjects to be debriefed include:




(2) Major malfunctions and the way they had been handled;
(3) Maintenance procedures and their compliance;
(4) Information type issues;
(5) Daily tasks and timing fulfillment;
(6) Exceptional events;
(7) Daily routine management;
(8) Open discussion about current feelings of personnel
and their concerns.
The debriefing technique should be based upon self-
debriefing. The principle of self-debriefing is expected to
encourage participation, promote satisfaction and educate
participants to honesty and openness.
3 . Attitudes of Targeted Sectors Toward the Suggested
Debriefing
Three sectors have been addressed in this study:
(1) Enlisted personnel of the "experimental" squadron;
(2) Line/department personnel of the same squadron; and
(3) Squadron commanders and maintenance sections'
commanders.
They have all extremely appreciated the debriefing in
general, and have expressed a favorable attitude toward the
idea. The only concern that has been expressed by "nonex-
perimental" commanders is the ability to actually carry out
the debriefing in a structural and routine manner. However,
the CO/MSCs have identified the following advantages of the
debriefing process:
(1) Improvement of maintenance standards;
(2) Mutual learning;
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(3) Better openness, morale and environment;
(4) Cohesiveness.
These perceived advantages tend to support some of the above
hypotheses.
4 . The Organizational Changes and Concerns to be
Considered When Implementing This Change
The following aspects are suggested to be considered
in the point of implementation:
(1) Environmental and cultural variables;
(2) The commitment of key players to the change;
(3) A leadership style of participation, encouragement
and support;
(4) Patience and reasonable expectations regarding the
pace of implementation and the standards for an
effective debrief at the beginning of the process.
The essence of the debriefing may be a controversial
issue to some extent. However, the findings of this study
strongly support the idea of the debriefing process as a
potential tool with many favorable and desirable advantages.
The question of attainability of such a process in the IAF
maintenance sections has been satisfactorily answered by the
successful implementation in squadron #1. If the debriefing
is a good idea and attainable, the conclusion must be to
implement it.
The writer has been convinced that the above conclu-
sions may be generalized to all IAF fighter squadrons. The
concepts and principles may be valid whether or not the
procedural aspects are strictly followed.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The writer recommends the establishment and implementa-
tion of a debriefing process throughout the IAF fighter
squadrons. The principles of such a debriefing should be
based on and conform to the conclusions of this study. The
initiation of the process may originate in any function or
level of the organization. However, compliance with the
implementation principles which have been suggested in this




The debriefing process is nothing more than a means to
achieve a higher level of effectiveness. Effectiveness,
loosely speaking, contains the aspects and advantages which
have been attributed to the debriefing process.
This study has demonstrated a strong positive attitude
toward the debriefing by commanders and subordinates, and
has pointed out some dimensions which appear to be better in
the "experimental" squadron. The ongoing maintenance
debriefing process is only a first attempt at implementing
the idea, and undoubtedly may be improved, with experience.
This study lacks "hard" evidence for actual output
improvement. Nevertheless, positive attitudes and cost-
benefit appearance on one hand, as well as proven
attainability on the other hand, seem to be persuasive
enough to apply the debriefing process.
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The debriefing process is an educational process. The
educational process is complicated and long term in nature.
Nevertheless, the writer is strong in his belief that the




The questionnaire of the squadron commanders (COs) and
maintenance-section commanders (MSCs) is presented below.
This questionnaire had been answered by the six COs and MSCs
of the three squadrons: the "experimental" squadron (#1) ,
and the two "control" squadrons (#2, #3). The questions
which had been asked are presented here, along with a
summary of the responses. The number of participants is
small (N = 6) , so statistical manipulation would not make
much sense. However, the reader may get some feeling by
looking at the median (MED) , the standard deviation (STDV)
,
and the .99 confidence interval (CI) computed using the
Wilcoxon procedure. A summary of the open-ended questions
has already been presented in Chapter V.
A. THE QUESTIONNAIRE
(1) The information I am trying to transfer down, reaches
everyone, to the last person. (MED =4, CI = (4,5),
STDV = .52. )
(2) There is no difficulty for anyone in the squadron to
raise any problem with me. (MED = 4.5, CI = (3,5),
STDV = .82.
)
(3) I know about all exceptional events in my squadron.
(MED = 4, CI = (3,5), STDV = .63.)
(4) The department/ line personnel are well aware of other
shop's problems. (MED = 4, CI = (2,5), STDV = 1.09.)
(5) I am very pleased with the training my enlisted
personnel receive. (MED = 4.5, CI = (4,5), STDV =
.55. )
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(6) The learning process from our own maintenance errors
is quite satisfactory. (MED = 4, CI = (3,5), STDV =
.75. )
(7) I am pleased with the way we debrief maintenance
errors. (MED = 5, CI = (4,5), STDV = .52.)
(8) If each individual maintenance error committed in the
squadron would reach everyone, we would probably




(9) I believe that learning from maintenance errors is
more effective than learning from successes. (MED =
4, CI = (3,5) , STDV = .89.
)
(10) I am pleased with our learning climate. (MED = 4.5,
CI = (4,5) , STDV = .55.)
(11) The morale in our maintenance-section is high. (MED
= 4, CI = (4,5), STDV = .41.)
(12) I am pleased with the interrelationship among our
enlisted. (MED =4, CI = (3,5), STDV = .63.)
(13) There is a great deal of mutual assistance among our
personnel. (MED = 3.5, CI = (3,5), STDV = .82.)
(14) I believe that our people inform their immediate
chiefs about their mistakes. (MED = 3.5, CI = (3,5),
STDV = .82.)
(15) Our juniors feel free to express themselves. (MED =
4, CI = (3,5) , STDV= .63.
)
(16) I am afraid that some of the informal opinions among
my men do not reach me. (MED = 1, CI = (1,3), STDV =
.84.
)
(17) As far as I know, the guys tell their immediate
chiefs the truth. (MED = 4, CI = (3,5), STDV = .63.)
(18) Generally speaking, I believe that our personnel do
not hide the truth from their commanders. (MED = 4,
CI = (1,5) , STDV = 1.37.
)
(19) Every enlisted man knows exactly what the commanders




(20) As a commander I feel that I have no problem knowing
the level of performance of each of my subordinates.
(MED =5, CI = (4,5), STDV = .45.)
(21) I depend upon my subordinates for evaluation
purposes. (MED = 3, CI = (1,4), STDV = 1.03.)
(22) I believe the line/department chiefs know their men
very well. (MED = 4.5, CI = (4,5), STDV = .55.)
(2 3) Every man in the squadron is aware of his peers'
opinions about himself. (MED =3, CI = (2,4), STDV =
.71.)
(24) I believe we should debrief only exceptional events.
(MED = 2.5, CI = (not enough data), STDV = 2.06.)
(25) I believe that extremely good performance should be
debriefed in public. (MED = 5, CI = (3,5), STDV =
.84. )
(26) Basically I believe we should debrief more if we had
the time. (MED = 4.5, CI = (4,5), STDV = .55.)
(27) Consider a situation where no time constraints exist.
The appropriate debriefing intervals would be: (1)
everyday; (2) every two days; (3) twice a week; (4)
once a week; (5) once every two weeks; (6)
exceptional events only. (MED = 2.5, CI = (1,5),
STDV = 1.47.
)
(28) Considering existing constraints, debriefing should
take place: (1) everyday; (2) every two days; (3)
twice a week; (4) once a week; (5) once every two
weeks; (6) exceptional events only. (MED =4, CI =
(1,6) , STDV = 1.7 6.)
(29) What do you think about the idea of having debrief-
ings in maintenance sections similar to the aircrews
section? What advantages do you see, and what, if
any, improvements?
(30) Assuming there is a need for the debriefing, what are
the appropriate forums?
(31) What are the issues to be debriefed?
(32) Is the debriefing "cost/beneficial?" How much is it
worth?
(33) Additional comments, please.
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